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I. INTRODUCTION
Interlocutogy appeals are disruptive, time-consuming and expensive. There are
instances, however, when the [egislature deems a right or remed so important hat
its vindication need not wait until the case concludes.1
For over one hundred twenty years, Texas law has allowed interlocutory
appeals2 -meaning appeals from decisions that are not final judgments-
in some form. Each time the Texas Legislature has carved out an exception
to the general rule that only final judgments are appealable, the legislature
has signaled the significance of that legal matter. This Article delves into
the evolution of Texas's interlocutory appeals statute with the related goals
of tracing the expanding subject matter of interlocutory appeals and
identifying what these changes reflect about legal priorities and
developments in Texas since the late nineteenth century.
Although interlocutory appeals "are strewn throughout Texas
1. Hernandez v. Ebrom, 289 S.W.3d 316, 322-23 (Tex. 2009) (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting)
(citations and paragraph break omitted).
2. For the first interlocutory appeal statute in Texas, allowing an interlocutory appeal from the
"appointment of a receiver or trustee[,]" see Act approved Apr. 13, 1892, 22d Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 17,
1, 1892 Tex. Gen. Laws 42, 43, reprintedin 10 H.P.N. GAMMEL, TheLaws of Texas 1822-1897, at 406,




St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 48 [2017], No. 1, Art. 3
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol48/iss1/3
INTERLOCUTORYAPPEALS IN TExAS: A HISTORY
statutes[,]"3 the focus here is on the thirteen disparate types of interlocutory
appeals currently permitted under the principal interlocutory appeal
statute-Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014.4 That
section allows for an appeal of an interlocutory order that:
* "appoints a receiver or trustee;" 
5
* "overrules a motion to vacate an order that appoints a receiver or
trustee;",
6
* "certifies or refuses to certify a class in a" claimed class action;
7
* "grants or refuses a temporary injunction or grants or overrules a
motion to dissolve a temporary injunction[;] "8
* "denies a motion for summary judgment that is based on an assertion
of immunity by an individual who is an officer or employee of the
state or a political subdivision of the state;"9
* "denies a motion for summary judgment" based on "a claim against
or defense by a member" of the media "or a person whose
communication appear[ed] in" the media "arising under the free
speech or free press clause" of the United States Constitution, the
Texas Constitution, or the Texas libel statute;10
* "grants or denies the special appearance" of a defendant;11
* "grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit;" 
12
* denies a physician either dismissal or attorney's fees or both in a
health care liability claim on grounds that the plaintiff did not timely
3. Hernandef, 289 S.W.3d at 323 (citations omitted).
4. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014 (West Supp. 2016).5. [d. § 51.014(a)(1).
6. [d. § 51.014(a)(2).
7. Id. § 51.014(a)(3). For Texas's rule of civil procedure governing class action lawsuits, see TEX.
R. Civ. P. 42.
8. CIv. PR-C. &REM. § 51.014(a)(4); see also id. ch. 65 (providing the law governing the availability
of injunctions and temporary restraining orders along with procedural requirements to these
"Extraordinary Remedies").
9. [d. § 51.014(a)(5).
10. Id. § 51.014(a)(6); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press .. "); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 8 (establishing free speech and
press guarantees in Texas); Civ. PRAC. & REM. ch. 73 (constituting the libel statute in Texas).
11. CIr. PR>AC. &REM. § 51.014a)(7) (excepting suits under the Texas Family Code); see also TEX.
R. CIV. P. 120(a) (authorizing a special appearance in Texas civil cases "for the purpose of objecting to
the jurisdiction of the court over the person or property of the defendant" on the basis that the "person
or property is not amenable to process" in Texas courts).
12. Civ. PR/Ac. & REM. § 51.014(a)(8). A "governmental unit," for purposes of
Section 51.014(a)(8), is defined under section 101.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
See id. § 101.001 (defining a "governmental unit" as including the "state [of Texas] and all the several
agencies of government that collectively constitute the government of th[e] state," "a political
subdivision of th[e] state," "an emergency service organization[,]" or any other governmental body that
has derived its power from the Texas Constitution or the Texas Legislature).
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serve an expert report;
13
* grants a motion challenging the adequacy of an expert report in a
health care liability claim;
14
* denies a motion to dismiss asbestos- or silica-related claims;1 5
* denies a motion to dismiss a claim based on the exercise of the right
of free speech, right of petition, or right of association under the
Texas Citizen Participation Act;
16
* "denies a motion for summary judgment filed by an electric utility"
under a statute limiting its liability.
17
The story of the enactment of these thirteen subsections-beginning in
1892 and ending in 2013 with the passage of the thirteenth provision-
reveals more than a century of legal concerns and legislative priorities. This
Article approaches the study in two primary parts. After a brief overview
of the primacy of final judgments, the first part examines interlocutory
appeal statutes in Texas prior to their codification in section 51.014 of the
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, covering the period from 1892 to
1985.18 Of primary concern are the types of orders subject to interlocutory
appeal and why, at the time that each provision passed, the legislature
concluded that these types of orders merited immediate appeal. The second
part analyzes interlocutory appeal provisions enacted after the codification
of section 51.014 in 1985 until 2013.19 The numerous amendments to
section 51.014 during this twenty-eight-year period fall into three categories:
13. Id. § 51.014(a)(9). Specifically, this subsection permits an interlocutory appeal where the lower
court "denies all or part of the relief sought by a motion under Section 74.351(b), except that an appeal
may not be taken from an order granting an extension under Section 74.351." Id. Section 74.351(b)
mandates that, if an expert report has not been served within the time period required by
section 74.351(a) and a timely motion has been filed, the court shall, subject to Section 74.351(c), award
"reasonable attorney's fees and costs of courts" as well as dismiss the claim with prejudice in relation
to the "affected physician or health care provider." Id. § 74.351(b).
14. Id. § 51.014(a)(10); see also id. § 74.351( (requiring a court to "grant a motion challenging the
adequacy of an expert report only if it appears to the court, after hearing, that the report does not
represent an objective good faith effort to comply with the definition of an expert report" in the
statute).
15. Id. § 51.014(a)(11). Section 90.007(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code permits
a defendant to file a "motion to dismiss [a] claimant's asbestos-related or silica-related claim" upon
the failure of the claimant to timely serve an expert report or upon the failure to serve an export report
in accordance with Sections 90.003 or 90.004. Id. § 90.007(a).
16. Id. § 51.014(a)(12); see also id. § 27.003(a) (permitting a motion to dismiss "[ilf a legal action is
based on, relates to, or is in response to a party's exercise of the right of free speech, right to petition,
or right of association").
17. Id. § 51.014(a)(13). For the provision in the Civil Practice and Remedies Code limiting utility
companies' liability, see id. § 75.0022.
18. See infra Section II.
19. See infra Section III.
[Vol. 48:65
4
St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 48 [2017], No. 1, Art. 3
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol48/iss1/3
INTERLOCUTORYAPPEALS IN TExAS: A HISTORY
they substantively expanded or altered the types of appealable interlocutory
orders, they affected the procedure for interlocutory appeals, or they were
minor "clean up" statutes. The second part of the Article focuses on the
first two categories.
A. The FinalJudgment Rule
Dating back to the Judiciary Act of 1789, the United States legal system
has generally adhered to the English common law approach of permitting
appeals only from "final decrees."20 This "final judgment rule"-central to
both federal and Texas law-provides that, as a general rule, a judgment is
appealable only if it finally decides all issues and disposes of all parties before
the court.2 1 The final judgment rule promotes judicial efficiency, avoids
piecemeal litigation, and "defer[s] to the decisions of the trial court."2 2 As
a result of this preference for final judgments, unless a statute authorizes an
interlocutory appeal, "Texas appellate courts have jurisdiction only over
final" judgments or orders.2 3 Beginning in the late nineteenth century, the
Texas Legislature began to pass statutes allowing narrow exceptions to the
final judgment rule, appeals referred to as interlocutory appeals.2 4
II. TRUSTEES AND RECEIVERS, INJUNCTIONS, AND CLASS ACTIONS:
INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS FROM 1892 TO 1985
A. Orders Appointing Trustees and Receivers
In 1892, the Texas Legislature passed the first law permitting an
20. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 73, 84 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012))
(permitting review of a district court's "final decrees and judgments" by a circuit court); see also
Alexandra B. Hess et al., Permissive Interlocutogy Appeals at the Court of Appeals for the Federal Gircuit: Fifteen
Yearsin Review (1995-2010), 60 AM. U.L. REv. 757, 759 (2011) (explaining Congress incorporated "the
English common law approach [of] only permit[ting] appeals from final judgments" into the Federal
Judiciary Act of 1789 (citations omitted)).
21. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001); N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Vex. 1996); Carleton M. Crick, The FinalJudgmentAs a BasisforAppea4,
41 YALE L.J. 539, 539 (1932); see Canter v. Am. Ins. Co., 28 U.S. 307, 318 (1830) ("It is of great
importance to the due administration of justice, and is in furtherance of the manifest intention of the
legislature, in giving appellate jurisdiction to this court uponfinaldecrees only, that causes should not
come up here in fragments upon successive appeals. It would occasion very great delays and oppressive
expenses."); Fid. Funding Co. of S.F. v. Hirshfeld, 91 S.W. 246, 246 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1906, no
writ) ("It is well-settled law in this state that no appeal can be prosecuted until after a final judgment
has been rendered, unless such an appeal is specially authorized by statute.").
22. 19 GEORGE C. PRAT, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 201.10[1] (3d ed. 2009).
23. Ogletree v. Matthews, 262 S.W.3d 316, 319 n.1 (Vex. 2007) (citation omitted).
24. See infra Section II; cf. Hess, et al., supra note 20, at 760 (discussing the passage of similar
statutes at the federal level).
20161
5
Thompson: Interlocutory Appeals in Texas: A History
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2017
ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:65
interlocutory appeal25 and laid the first building block in what would
become an extensive list of statutorily permitted interlocutory appeals under
today's section 51.014 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. The
provision was part of the 1892 law that organized the courts of civil appeals
and defined the jurisdiction and power of those courts.2 6 It provided that,
in addition to appeals from final judgments of the district and county
courts,2 7 "an appeal shall lie from an interlocutory order of the district court
appointing a receiver or trustee in any cause."128  The appeal had to "be
taken within twenty days" of the entry of the order, and the interlocutory
appeal had precedence over other cases in the appellate court.2 9 But trial
court proceedings were not "stayed during the pendency of the appeal
unless otherwise ordered by the appellate court. "30 In a separate law, the
1892 legislature provided that judgments by the "courts of civil appeals shall
be final in all appeals from interlocutory orders appointing receivers or
25. Act approved Apr. 13, 1892, 22d Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 17, § 1, 1892 Tex. Gen. Laws 42, 43,
reprinted in 10 H.P.N. GAMMEL, The Laws of Texas 1822-1897, at 406, 407 (Austin, Gammel Book Co.
1898) (current version at TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(1)); see - Naylor v. Naylor,
128 S.W. 475, 477 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1910, no writ) (stating no appeals may be taken from a
final judgment "except from interlocutory orders appointing a receiver or trustee, and except also from
an order granting or dissolving a temporary injunction" (citation omitted)); Cotton v. Rand, 92 S.W.
266, 267 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1906, writ dism'd) ("The only exception to the rule in this
state, that appeals can be taken only from final judgments, is an appeal from an interlocutory order of
the district court appointing a receiver or trustee in any cause."). Eight years later, in 1900, the Federal
Judiciary Act was amended to allow interlocutory appeal of orders in receivership. Act ofJune 6, 1900,
ch. 803, § 7, 31 Stat. 660, 660-61 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 1292(a) (2012)).
26. Act approved Apr. 13, 1892, 22d Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 17, 1, 1892 Tex. Gen. Laws 42, 43,
reprinted in 10 H.P.N. GAMMEL, The Laws of Texas 1822-1897, at 406, 407 (Austin, Gammel Book Co.
1898).
27. Id. (current version at Civ. PRAc. & REM. § 51.012).
28. Id. (current version at CIV. PRAC. & REM.S 51.014(a)(1)); see Merchs.' Transfer Co. v.
Hildebrand, 200 S.W. 551, 552 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1918, no writ) (discussing passage of the
statute allowing appeal from an interlocutory order appointing a receiver). The previous version ofthe
statute in the Revised Statutes of 1879 simply provided, "An appeal or writ of error may be taken to
the supreme court from every final judgment of the district court in civil cases." Act of Feb. 21, 1879,
16th Leg., R.S., tit. XXIX, ch. 19, art. 1380,phntedin The Revised Statutes of Texas, at 214,214 (Galveston,
A. H. Belo & Co. 1879) (current version at CIV. PRAc. & REM. § 51.012). Four years earlier, the
supreme court concluded it had no jurisdiction over "an interlocutory judgment of the court, which
merely grants an injunction, and appoints a receiver," which the court viewed as "strictly ancillary to
the main proceedingsH and merely intended to preserve the property in dispute pending the litigation."
E. & W. Tex. Lumber Co. v. Williams, 71 Tex. 444, 450 (1888). The court stated that "because there
ha[d] been no final judgment in the court below," the court had no jurisdiction and, as a result,
dismissed the appeal. Id. at 451.
29. Act approved Apr. 13, 1892, 22d Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 17, § 1, 1892 Tex. Gen. Laws 42, 43,
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trustees or such other interlocutory appeals as may be allowed by law[.]" 3 1
As a result, the Supreme Court of Texas had no jurisdiction over the
interlocutory appeals.32
Why were orders appointing receivers and trustees the first (and by
implication the most pressing) type of order authorized for interlocutory
appeal in Texas? And why were the pressures and interests contributing to
its passage so strong in 1892? The session law and associated Senate and
House proceedings do not state the reason for passing the interlocutory
appeal legislation. But the broader legislative and historical context explains
why the appointment of receivers and trustees was at the forefront of
legislators' attention in 1892.
In 1874, the Texas Supreme Court recognized, "We have no statute
regulating the subject of receivers. Though the authority of the courts to
appoint them has been long recognized, yet the record in this case shows
that the practice in making such appointments, and in calling the officer to
account, is unsettled and loose."3 3 Yet the appointment of receivers was
common. In 1891, "about one-half of the railroads of the [s]tate were in the
hands of receivers."3 4 This development reflected national railroad distress,
for after extensive building of railroads after the Civil War, a wave of railroad
insolvencies followed.35 Many of these insolvent railroads sought "the
protection of a federal equity receivership pending reorganization. "36
Although the federal judiciary commonly oversaw railroad receiverships-
"assum[ing] a role akin to episodic public management of the railways"'3 7
Texas courts also appointed receivers for railroad companies.38
By the 1890s, there was growing populist-minded resentment against the
railroads as a result of their overexpansion and financial troubles.3 9 In
31. Id. ch. 15, § 5, 1892 Tex. Gen. Laws at 26, 10 H.P.N. GAMMEL, The Laws of Texas 1822-1897,
at 390 (Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898).
32. See First Natl Bank of Dall. v. Brown, 53 S.W.2d 604, 605-)6 (Vex. 1932) (concluding the
Texas Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction because the trial court entered "an interlocutory
receivership order," and not a final judgment).
33. Weems v. Lathrop, 42 Tex. 207, 213 (1874).
34. The Texas Commission as the Savior of Railways, 38 RAILWAY AGE 100 July 22, 1904).
35. Sidney Post Simpson, Fif Years ofAmerican Equiy, 50 HARv. L. REV. 171, 191 (1936).
36. Id.; William E. Forbath, Law and the Shaping of theAmerican LaborMoement, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1109, 1155 (1998).
37. WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 67
(1991).
38. See Howe v. Harding, 13 S.W. 41, 42 (Vex. 1890) (recognizing the appellant as the judicially-
appointed receiver of the Houston, East & West Texas Railway Company); Bonner v. Hearne, 12 S.W.
38, 38 (Vex. 1889) (identifying the "appelleeH as receiver of the International & Great Northern
Railroad Company, appointed by" the Anderson County district court).
39. David F. Prindle, Railroad Commission, HANDBOOK TEX. ONLINE (June 15, 2010),
20161
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addition, abuses arose from the appointment of railroad receivers.
Governor James Hogg stressed some of these abuses in his letter to the
Texas Legislature in 1891: "Some of the railroads have been placed and held
in the hands of receivers long beyond the term prescribed by our [s]tate
laws, and occasionally are operated by non resident receivers under the
orders of federal judges in other [s]tates."14 0 Hogg decried the "increase [of]
[e]ncumbrances" on the railroads "to the detriment of the public" and
creditors and the "exorbitant fees and salaries paid to useless officers in the
apparent indulgence of favoritism and nepotism[.]"41  He concluded that
"the connection of these judges and officers with the receiverships and
roads would demand investigation."' 42  Proposed bills-bills that did not
become law-before the 1892 legislature included bills "[f]ixing the salaries
of receivers, attorneys for receivers and other appointees concerning
receiverships" and amending a law4 3 "entitled 'an [A]ct to provide for the
appointment of receivers and to define their powers and duties[.]' 
4 4
In addition, when James S. Hogg called a special session of the legislature
in 1892, two of the sixteen enumerated purposes of the called session related
to receivers.45  First, Hogg called the special session to amend the law to
make "receivers of railroads and other corporations" liable for damages
when their negligence "in executing their trusts" caused death or injury to
others.46 The second purpose was "[f]o receive and act upon" a report by
a "committee appointed to investigate" the "case of Jay Gould vs. the
International and Great Northern Railroad Company in the [d]istrict [c]ourt
of Smith County" and associated cases involving the railroad and its
receivers.47  These cases involved alleged impropriety in the appointment
of receivers in addition to other abuses-and the report from their
investigation was one focal point of the 1892 called session in the House
http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/mdr0l; Creation of the Railroad Commission of
Texas, RAILROAD COMMISSION TEX. (July20, 2015, 12:17 PM), www.rrc.state.tx.us/about-
us/history/informal-history-toc/creation-of-the-rrc/"
40. H.J. of Tex., 22d Leg., R.S. 115 (1891) (message of GovernorJames S. Hogg to the House).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Act approved Mar. 19, 1889, 21stLeg., R.S., ch. 59, § 6,1889 Tex. Gen. Laws 55, 56, rprnted
in 9 H.P.N. GAMMEL, The Laws of Texas 1822-1897, at 55, 55 (Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898).
44. H.J. of Tex., 22d Leg., R.S. 1018, 1079 (1891) (bill index). The Senate considered similar bills.
S.J. of Tex., 22d Leg., R.S. 775-76 (1891) (bill index).
45. H.J. of Tex., 22d Leg., 1st C.S. 1-2 (1892) (message of GovernorJames S. Hogg to the
House).
46. Id. at 2.
47. Id. at 2, 126; see also id. at 126-33 (1892) (majority report); S.J. of Tex., 22d Leg., 1st C.S. 2
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and Senate.48
Jay Gould, the "[W]izard of Wall Street" and labeled by some as "the
Greatest Financier of Modern Times[,]" effectively "dominated the
transportation system of Texas" in the 1880s.4 9 In 1879, Gould acquired
control of the International and Great Northern Railroad Company
(I&GN), which he then leased to another railroad company he controlled,
the Missouri, Kansas, and Texas Railroad Company.50  In February 1889,
Gould filed suit in the district court of Smith County against I&GN for
payment of promissory notes aggregating about $500,000.51 Numerous
parties intervened and asserted personal injury and other damage claims
against I&GN. 52 Ultimately, creditors filed numerous suits against I&GN
in the Smith County district court, I&GN went into receivership that
stretched until 1892, and during the receivership, various receivers received
appointments and resigned or died.53
In March 1891, the Texas House and Senate passed a resolution
"authorizing the appointment of a committee to investigate the case of Jay
Gould versus the International and Great Northern [R]ailway [C] ompany in
the district court of Smith County, and all the proceedings in that and other
courts of the state affecting said railway company and its receivers."5 4 The
resolution stated that "grave charges have been made in the public prints
and by current report, which tendH to bring in disrepute the courts of this
48. See H.J. of Tex., 22d Leg., 1st C.S. 126-33 (1892) (printing majority report); S.J. of Tex., 22d
Leg., 1st C.S. 109-16 (1892) (printing majority report); see also An Inventoy ofJoint Committee to Investigate
the Receivership of the International &- Great Northern Railroad Records at the Texas State Archives, 1891, TEX.
ST. LIBR. ARCHIVES COMMISSION, www.lib.utexas.edu/taro/tslac/70030/tsl-70030.html (last visited
Nov. 12, 2016) [hereinafter Committee to Investigate the Receivership of the I CTN Records] (explaining the
duration, complexity, money involved, "and the fact that there were several changes in the receivership
administration led to charges of inefficiency and overpayment for their services").
49. Robert L. Peterson, Jay Gould and the Railroad Commission of Texas, 58 Sw. HIST. Q. 422,422 n.1
(1955); see JANET SCHMELZER, OUR FIGHTING GOVERNOR: THE LIFE OF THOMAS M. CAMPBELL
AND THE POLITICS OF PROGRESSIVE REFORM IN TEXAS 8-11 (2014) (discussing the International
and Great Northern case and the contention between Gould and Hogg and the Railroad Commission).
50. Committee to Investigate the Receivership of the I CTN Records, supra note 48.
51. H.J. ofTex., 22d Leg., 1st C.S. 126 (1892) (majority report).
52. Id. at 127-128.
53. Id. at 127-31; see Stephen J. Lubben, Railroad Receiverships and Modern Bankruptg Theoy,
89 CORNELL L. REV. 1420, 1458-59 (2004) (including "the International and Great Northern's
receivership"-and its bankruptcy proceeding-in a study of receiverships between 1890 and 1938).
In addition, Herndon v. Campbell, 23 S.W. 558, 55841 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1893), rev'd, 23 S.W.
980, 980-81 (Tex. 1893), indicates the contention among Judge Felix McCord, the receivers, and the
attorneys involved in the I&GN case.
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state touching the pending receivership of the [railroad.]"5 5  During the
special legislative session in 1892, committee members submitted a
majority56 and minority report to the legislature.57  The majority report
traced the numerous suits and receiverships involved and concluded that it
did not appear that the judge or receivers had "acted corruptly or with intent
to violate their official duties, either in the procurement, administration or
continuation of said receivership. " 5' But the report asserted that "[t]he laws
regulating receiverships are defective in many particulars" including that
there was an "absence of statutory regulations" and "conflicting
precedents"-so that "[m]uch is left to construction and much to the
discretion of the court in which the proceedings are pending."5 9 The report
recommended various statutory amendments, which did not include
interlocutory appeal of orders appointing receivers.60 But the minority
report submitted by Senator H.M. Garwood harshly criticized the
appointment of the I&GN receivers, in addition to other aspects of the
receivership. 61  The minority report concluded that the negotiations
between Gould's attorneys and the receivership general solicitor concerning
the resignation of a solicitor and appointment of another bore "all the
semblance of a barter and sale[.]" 62 The report charged that the receivers
were paid "[e]xtravagant salaries" and that a receiver was a partner in a bank
that the court designated as the depository for the receivership-an
arrangement "improper and contrary to law[.]" ' 63 The minority report also
found that the Smith County district court judge, Felix McCord, promised
"privately and in advance of his judicial determination, that he would
appoint" a certain person as receiver, which "was highly unbecoming a
judicial officer."' 6 4 The minority report harshly criticized the "appointment
of T.M. Campbell as receiver, over the objections of all parties, made
privately, after a public hearing had been demanded and promised" and
concluded the appointment "was illegal and improper, evincing a disregard
both of judicial decorum and the rights of litigants. "
65
55. H.J. ofTex., 22d Leg., R.S. 768 (1891).
56. H.J. of Tex., 22d Leg., 1st C.S. 126-33 (1892) (majority report).
57. Id. at 134-37 (minority report).
58. Id. at 132.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 135-37.
62. Id. at 135.
63. Id. at 135-136.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 136. Campbell, a Hogg supporter, was later elected governor of Texas. See SCHMELZER,
supra note 49, at 8-11 (discussing the relationship between Hogg and Campbell and Campbell's
[Vol. 48:65
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So, when legislators met in regular session in 1891 and special session in
1892, legislative committee reports and the governor leveled harsh criticism
on receivers and their sometimes "illegal and improper" appointments.
66
In addition, the legislature sought to pass laws to regulate the salaries and
affect the appointment, powers, duties, and liability of receivers.67 In this
context, the legislature's passage of the first interlocutory appeal statute
allowing for immediate appeal of orders appointing receivers and trustees is
understandable. Apparently, the legislature viewed the need to address these
perceived abuses as significant and pressing and that they called for the
enactment of the first interlocutory appeal provision in Texas.
B. Temporary Injunctions
Fifteen years later, in 1907, the Texas Legislature authorized a second
type of interlocutory appeal: appeal of a "granted or dissolved" temporary
injunction.68  As amended two years later, the law provided that a party
appointment as receiver of the I&GN). The minority report did "not deem it proper to" offer "any
recommendation as to the proper course to be pursued in the premises, but submit[ted] the [report's]
conclusions as fully substantiated by the evidence ... before [the] committee." H.J. of Tex., 22d Leg.,
1st C.S. 137 (1892) (minority report).
66. H.J. of Tex., 22d Leg., 1st C.S. 136 (1892) (minority report); H.J. of Tex., 22d Leg., R.S. 115
(1891) (message of Governor James S. Hogg to the House) (noting some railroads had been placed in
the control of receivers longer than the time prescribed by law and demanded investigation due to the
connection of the receivers and the judges who appointed them).
67. The Twenty-second Texas Legislature accomplished this, in part, by amending article 2899 of
the Revised Civil Statutes of 1879. Act of Feb. 21, 1879, 16th Leg., R.S., tit. LII, art. 2899,printedin
The Revised Statutes of Texas, at 419, 419 (Galveston, A. H. Belo & Co. 1879), amended &y Act approved
Apr. 11, 1892, 22d Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 7, § 1, 1892 Tex. Gen Laws 5, 5-6, reprinted in 10 H.P.N. GAMMEL,
The Laws of Texas 1822-1897, at 369, 369-70 (current version at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§71.002(d)-(e)) (adding language making receivers of railroads liable for injuries to persons); see also
S.J. of Tex., 22d Leg., 1st C.S. 14 (1892) (noting the law making railway and other corporations liable
for death caused by their or their servants' negligence did not cover "receivers in charge of corporate
property" and suggesting the law should be amended so "that these receivers and the corporate
property operated by them shall be made liable also").
68. Act approved Apr. 16, 1907, 30th Leg., R.S., ch. 107, § 2-4, 1907 Tex. Gen. Laws 206, 206
(amended 1909) (current version at CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 51.014(a)(4)). In 1909, the legislature
amended the law to provide for interlocutory appeal of a "granted, refused or dissolved" temporary
injunction. Act approved Apr. 22, 1909, 31st Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 34, § 2-4, 1909 Tex. Gen. Laws 354,
355 (current version at Civ. PRAc. & REM. § 51.014(a)(4)). In the Revised Civil Statutes of 1911, the
compilers placed the provisions allowing "[a]ppeals from interlocutory orders granting or dissolving
temporary injunctions" and "appeals from interlocutory order[s] appointing receiver, or trustee"
together as exceptions to the final judgment rule stated in an immediately preceding provision. Act
approved Apr. 1, 1911, 32d Leg., R.S., it. 37, ch. 20, arts. 2079-80,printedin Revised CivilStatutes of the
State of Texas, at 449, 449 (Austin Printing Co. 1912) (current version at Civ. PRAc. & REM.
§ 51.014(a)(1), (3)); id. art. 2078 (current version at CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 51.012) (permitting "[a]n
appeal or writ of error" only in the case of a "final judgment" from civil cases in a county court and
civil court); see also id. tit. 69, ch. 1, arts. 4644-46, at 948-49 (stating 1909 law for interlocutory appeal
11
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could appeal the grant, refusal, or dissolution of a temporary injunction to a
court of civil appeals having jurisdiction "not later than fifteen days after the
entry of record" of the injunction order or judgment.6 9 The appeal did not
suspend enforcement of the injunction unless the trial court ordered
suspension.70 The court of civil appeals or supreme court7 1 heard the case
based on the "bill and answer," any evidence and affidavits admitted in the
trial court, and-if the parties chose to submit briefs-on the parties'
briefs.7 2 The law gave appeals of temporary injunctions "priority over other
cases pending in" the court of civil appeals or supreme court.73
Although records of the legislature in 1907 and 1909 do not indicate the
reasons for allowing interlocutory appeals of temporary injunctions,7 4 case
law identifies "the evil intended to be remedied" by the law.75  In 1915,
of orders concerning temporary injunctions). Prior to this legislation, courts considered orders
concerning temporary injunctions not to be appealable, final judgments. See Miller v. Berry, 13 Tex.
208, 208 (1854) (concluding judgment dissolving temporary injunction was not a final judgment
reviewable by writ of error).
69. Act approved Apr. 22, 1909, 31st Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 34, § 2, 1909 Tex. Gen. Laws 354, 355
(current version at CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 51.014(a)(4)). In 1919, the legislature further amended the
law to extend the time permitted for filing the transcript of the case involving a temporary injunction
with the court of civil appeals. Act of Feb. 6, 1919, 36th Leg., R.S., ch. 17, § 1, 1919 Tex. Gen. Laws
22, 22 (providing that transcript for the case be filed with the clerk of the court of civil appeals "not
later than twenty days after the entry of record of such order or judgment granting, refusing[,]
dissolving or refusing to dissolve" the temporary injunction).
70. Act approved Apr. 22, 1909, 31st Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 34, § 2, 1909 Tex. Gen. Laws 354, 355.
71. Although the law referred to the supreme court hearing interlocutory appeals of temporary
injunctions, members of the supreme court split on the question of whether the supreme court had
jurisdiction over such appeals in light of other law specifying that judgments of the court of civil appeals
were final over interlocutory appeals. Compare Spence v. Fenchler, 180 S.W. 597, 600-)2 (Tex. 1915)
(assuming jurisdiction over the appeal), with McFarland v. Hammond, 173 S.W. 645, 645 (Tex. 1915)
(concluding review by writ of error not authorized).
72. Act approved Apr. 22, 1909, 31st Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 34, § 3, 1909 Tex. Gen. Laws 354, 355.
73. Id. § 4, 1909 Tex. Gen. Laws at 356.
74. In 1907, Senator AlfredJ. Harper, an attorney and future judge of the Court of Criminal
Appeals of Texas, first proposed the provisions to allow interlocutory appeals of injunction orders, but
he revealed no reasons for the proposed provisions. S.J. of Tex., 30th Leg., R.S. 1000 (1907). Harper
added the provisions to a House bill amending article 2989 of the Revised Civil Statutes of 1895, Act
effective Sep. 1, 1895, 24th Leg., R.S., tit. LVI, art. 2989,phntedin Revised CivilStatutes ofthe State of Texas,
at 577, 577 (Austin, Eugene Von Boeckmann 1895), governing the grant of temporary injunctions. S.J.
of Tex., 30th Leg., R.S. 1000 (1907). The focus of the bill was to provide that no district judge could
grant a writ of injunction returnable in any court but his own. H.J. of Tex., 30th Leg., R.S. 98, 417-18
(1907); see also 4 FRANKW.JOHNSON, AHiSTORY OF TEXAS AND TEXANS 1608-09 (1914) (describing
Senator Harper's service as a state senator).
75. Hamner v. Garrett, 132 S.W. 951, 952 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1910, no writ) (clarifying
the "evil intended to be remedied" was the "slow and tedious remedy of appeal from [a] final
judgment"). In 1891, the Federal Judiciary Act authorized appeals in the federal courts from
interlocutory appeals in equity "grant[ing] or continu[ing]" injunctions. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517,
7, 26 Stat. 826, 828 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012)). Texas legislative records do
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Supreme Court Justice William Hawkins expressed in a dissenting opinion
that the "statutes concerning interlocutory appeals in injunction cases, from
caption to emergency clause, evidence a determination upon the part of the
legislature to give the whole subject bold, and in many respects original, not
to say heroic, treatment."71 6 Hawkins stated:
The entire plan of allowing appeals from orders or judgments granting,
refusing, or dissolving temporary injunctions involved a distinct departure
from the ancient policy of our laws, and was out of harmony with the
provisions of our statutes relating to appeals which, for the most part, were
restricted to review of 'final judgments,' an exception being found in the
provisions... authorizing an appeal from 'an interlocutory order of the
district court appointing a receiver or trustee in any cause.'
7 7
In 1910, the court of civil appeals in Fort Worth explained:
Prior to the [A]ct of 1907 ... , appeals were not allowed from interlocutory
orders in injunction cases, but whatever the merits of the application when
refused, or whatever its demerits when granted, the party injuriously affected
was remitted to his slow and tedious remedy of appeal from the final judgment
in the cause when the case was finally reached in the trial court. It was the
purpose of the act, then, to afford a speedy remedy by an immediate appeal
from the order granting, refusing, or dissolving the temporary writ,
irrespective of the final determination of the merits of the cause to which the
injunction was an incident, and this, too, whether the order with respect to
the injunction be made in term time or in vacation.
7 8
The court concluded:
[T]he evident purpose of its framers was to enlarge the rights of such parties
[to injunction suits] by conferring upon them a remedy they had previously
not possessed, viz., the right to an immediate review of that branch of their
case granting, refusing, or dissolving the temporary writ of injunction.
7 9
A decade after passage of the 1907 law allowing interlocutory appeals of
temporary injunctions, an attorney extolled the innovative and beneficial
not indicate whether the federal statute influenced Texas legislators in 1907 when they enacted the
statute authorizing interlocutory appeals of temporary injunctions.
76. McFarland v. Hammond, 173 S.W. 645, 652 (Tex. 1915) (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
77. Id.
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nature of the first two types of interlocutory appeals in Texas. The Texas
Bar Association's 1917 annual meeting included a debate of a proposal to
allow the interlocutory appeal of orders granting new trials.8 0 In explaining
his support for the proposal, Richard Mays of Corsicana argued, "This is
not new. Why, for a long, long time there was no right of appeal allowed
one against whom an injunction had been rendered, or against whom an
injunction had been dissolved."81  He noted that "as pioneers, we ... gave
the right of appeal in these two instances."8 2 He argued, "Who can say that
has not expedited and settled litigation in this [s]tate, and protected the
rights of litigants?"18 3  He noted that "the same proposition has been
extended to the granting of receivers. "84 He proposed, "I do not suppose
a man in this assembly would urge a proposition to abolish the right of
appeal from injunction orders and the appointment of receivers. s" 8 5  Mays
continued, "It has worked well. It has expedited litigation. It has not
clogged the courts. 1
s6
80. Texas BarAssociation Proceedings of the Thiry-Sixth Annual Session, 36 TEX. BAR AS'N 18, 18-35
(1917) [hereinafter Texas Bar Association Proceedings]. Seven years later, the Texas Legislature acted on
this proposal-enacting legislation providing for an interlocutory appeal of"every order of any district
or county court in civil cases granting motions for new trials ... and such appeal shall be taken within
the same time and in the same manner as if the judgment was final." Act of Feb. 23, 1925, 39th Leg.,
R.S., ch. 18, § A, 1925 Tex. Gen. Laws 45, 45 (current version at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 51.102). The legislature repealed the law two years later. Act approved Feb. 21, 1927, 40th Leg.,
R.S., ch. 52, § 1, 1927 Tex. Gen. Laws 75, 75 (current version at CIV. PRAc. & REM. § 51.012). The
repealing Act explained that after:
the codification of 1925 . .. numerous appeals have been taken to the Court of Civil Appeals
from orders of district and county courts in civil cases, granting motions for new trials for the
sole purpose of securing delay to litigants and that in almost every case the order of the lower
court has been affirmed for the reason that the granting of new trials is largely discretionary with
the trial court and not subject to reversal except for abuse of discretion, and the further fact that
such appeals have greatly [e]ncumbered the dockets of the various courts of civil appeals and
increased the burden of such courts in numerous cases where there is no merit in the appeal.
Id. § 2, 1927 Tex. Gen. Laws at 75-76; see also In re Columbia Med. Ctr. ofLas Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P.,
290 S.W.3d 204, 209 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding) (stating plaintiffs argument "that appellate review
of orders granting new trials is inconsistent with legislative intent because the legislature once passed a
law allowing appeals from such orders, but repealed it two years later" (first citing Act of Feb. 23, 1925,
39th Leg., R.S., ch. 18, § A, 1925 Tex. Gen. Laws 45, 45; and then citing Act approved Feb. 21, 1927,
40th Leg., R.S., ch. 52, § 1, 1927 Tex. Gen. Laws 75, 75)).
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C. Overru/ing a Motion to Vacate an OrderAppointing a Receiver or Trustee
During the same year Mays spoke, the Texas Legislature considered and
passed a third category of interlocutory appeal. This third type was an
enlargement and clarification of the first type enacted into Texas law-
appeals of orders appointing receivers and trustees. The 1917 Texas
Legislature authorized an appeal "from an interlocutory order of the district
court overruling a motion to vacate an order appointing a receiver or trustee
in any case[.]"17 The law required an appeal to "be taken within twenty days
from the entry of such order appealed from" and provided such appeals
"take precedence in the appellate court[s.]" 88 "But the proceedings in other
respects in the court shall not be stayed during the pendency of the appeal,
unless" the appellate court ordered a stay.8 9
Why did the legislature perceive a pressing need to allow an appeal of this
type of interlocutory order, particularly when the first type-appeal of
orders appointing receivers and trustees-is so closely related? In his "Full
Report" on House Bill 332,90 Representative Rufus Templeton9 1 reported
to the Speaker of the House, "It is believed that since the present law is
indefinite in matters of this sort, this bill should immediately pass."19 2 The
"indefinite" status of "the present law" likely derived from inconsistent
court decisions since the 1890s concerning whether an order overruling a
motion to vacate the appointment of a receiver was subject to interlocutory
appeal under the first statute allowing interlocutory appeals of orders
appointing receivers. Two early cases treated an appeal of an order
overruling a motion to vacate appointment of a receiver as an appeal "from
an interlocutory decree ... appointing ... [a] receiver" without
discussion.93 But beginning in 1906 and over the next decade, numerous
appellate cases held that an order overruling or dismissing a motion to
vacate the appointment of a receiver "cannot be treated as an order
87. Act approved Mar. 30, 1917, 35th Leg., R.S., ch. 168, § 1, 1917 Tex. Gen. Laws 379, 379
(current version at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(2)).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. H. Comm. on Cir. Procedure, Full Report, Tex. H.B. 332, 35th Leg., R.S. (1917),
http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/LASDOCS/35R/HB332/HB332_35R.pdf#page=4.
91. See Rufus L. Tempeton, LEGIS. REFERENCE LIBR. TEX., http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/
legeleaders/members/memberdisplay.c fm?memberID= 1363 (last visited Nov. 13, 2016)
(summarizing Rufus L. Templeton's service in the Texas House of Representatives).
92. H. Comm. on Civ. Procedure, Full Report, Tex. H.B. 332, 35th Leg., R.S. (1917),
http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/LASDOCS/35R/HB332/IB332_35R.pdf#page=4.
93. New Birmingham Iron & Land Co. v. Blevins, 34 S.W. 828, 828, 834 (Tex. Civ. App.-
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appointing a receiver from which the right of appeal is given by the statute"
allowing an interlocutory appeal.9 4 In 1917, the legislature acted to clear up
this inconsistency.
95
The interrelation between the first and third types of enacted
interlocutory appeals that form present-day Civil Practice and Remedies
Code section 51.014(a)(1) and (2)-appeals of orders appointing receivers
and trustees and appeals of orders overruling a motion to vacate the
appointment of a receiver or trustee-appears obvious. Yet at first blush
they appear unconnected to the other early category of interlocutory
appeals: appeal of orders granting, refusing, or dissolving temporary
injunctions. But in 1933, the supreme court explained that "granting or
refusing temporary injunctions" and "appointing receivers" were
"exceptions as to the necessity for final judgments before appeal."96 The
court noted that "the statutes permit[ted] appeals from [these] interlocutory
orders of trial courts" because appeals under these statutes "are predicated
upon judgments, which though interlocutory in form as effectively deprive
the litigant of his rights or his property for the time being as do final
judgments or decrees."9 7
D. Class Actions
Over six decades passed before the Texas Legislature enacted another
type of interlocutory appeal that is currently in Civil Practice and Remedies
Code section 51.01498: Appeal from an interlocutory order "[c]ertifying or
94. Tex. & 0. Lumber Co. v. Applegate, 114 S.W. 1159, 1160 (Vex. Civ. App-Galveston 1908,
no writ); see Williams v. Watt, 171 S.W. 266, 268-69 (Tex. Civ. App. -San Antonio 1914, no writ)
(holding an appeal could not be taken from the order refusing to vacate the receivership); Moore v.
Cobe, 156 S.W. 1142, 1143-44 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1913, writ refd) (deciding an order, which
overrules a motion to vacate the receivership, is not appealable (citing Fid. Funding Co. of S.F. v.
Hirshfield, 91 S.W. 246, 246 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1906, no writ)); Maund v. Davidson, 123 S.W.
228, 228-29 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1909, no writ) (declaring the law permitted no appeal from
refusing a motion "to vacate an order appointing a receiver'); Uid. Funding Co., 91 S.W. at 246 ("This
statute does not authorize an appeal from an order overruling a motion to set aside and vacate an order
appointing the receiver, but only authorizes an appeal from the order appointing the receiver, and
requires that right to be exercised within twenty days after the entry of such order.").
95. Almost ninety years later, in 2006, the Texas Supreme Court recognized, "The [1]egislature
enacted the statute permitting interlocutory appeal of orders overruling motions to vacate orders
appointing receivers or trustees in 1917, and the provision remains substantially unchanged today."
De Ayala v. Mackie, 193 S.W.3d 575, 579 (Tex. 2006).
96. Morrow v. Corbin, 62 S.W.2d 641, 650 (Tex. 1933).
97. Id. at 650-51. The court also described cases involving "determining pleas of privilege" as a
third type of interlocutory order that a party could appeal under Texas law. Id. at 650. This Article
does not discuss interlocutory appeals of pleas of privilege as they are not a class of interlocutory appeal
allowed under the current Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014.
98. In the interim, the legislature tweaked the interlocutory appeal statute. In 1943, the legislature
[Vol. 48:65
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refusing to certify a class in a suit brought pursuant to Rule 42 of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure."9 9
Enacted in 1979, this provision authorizing interlocutory appeals of class
certification decisions flowed from the Texas Supreme Court's adoption of
revised Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42 in 1977.100 Commentators
recognized that "the Texas Supreme Court took a major step in modernizing
the Texas class action lawsuits when it adopted a new Rule 42" and
proclaimed that the new rule "should result in modernizing Texas class
action practice without revolutionizing it."
10 1
One catalyst for the interest in class action lawsuits in the late 1970s-
and, by extension, the perceived need for interlocutory appeal of orders
concerning class certification-flowed from a series of the United States
Supreme Court decisions that "effectively closed the federal courthouse to
class actions in diversity cases. " 10 2  Proponents of the Uniform Class
Action Act desired to resuscitate class action practice.10 3 In response, the
Texas Supreme Court completely redrafted Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
42.104 The revised Rule 42 adopted in 1977 reflected revisions made to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure eleven years earlier.
105
Rule 42 resulted from the "work of a subcommittee of the Administration
of Justice Committee" of the State Bar of Texas.1 0 During the committee
amended the statute allowing interlocutory appeals of orders "appointing a receiver or trustee" or
orders "[o]verruling a motion to vacate" such an order to include orders issued of county courts and
county courts at law in addition to interlocutory orders of district courts. Act of May 7, 1943, 48th
Leg., R.S., ch. 305, § 1-2, 1943 Tex. Gen. Laws 456, 456-57 (current version at TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE § 51.014(a)).
99. Act of May 3, 1979, 66th Leg., R.S., ch. 159, § 1, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 348, 348 (current
version at CIV. PRAC. &REM. § 51.014(a)(3)).
100. H. Comm. on Judiciary, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 255, 66th Leg., R.S. (1979); see also Civil
Procedure Rules Amendment: OfficialCourt Order, 40 TEX. B.J. 563, 563-64 (1977) (revising Rule 42).
101. Michol O'Connor, Legislative Program: Amendment to Article 2250, 42 TEx. B.J. 23, 23 (1979);
see also Joseph Jaworski, The New Texas Class Actions Rule; A Comparison to the Federal Rule, Hous. LAW.,
Nov.-Dec. 1977, at 25, 25.
102. William V. Dorsaneo III, The Histoy of Texas CivilProcedure, 65 BAYLORL. REv. 713, 769-70
(2013); see also, e.g., Zahn v. Intl Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301-02 (1973) ("Each plaintiff in a Rule
23Qb)(3) class action must satisfy the jurisdictional amount, and any plaintiff who does not must be
dismissed from the case-'one plaintiff- may not ride in on another's coattails."' (citation omitted)),
superseded &y statute, Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-650, § 1367, 104 Stat. 5089, 5113
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012)), as recogni-ed in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc.,
545 U.S. 546, 566-67 (2005).
103. Dorsaneo III, supra note 102, at 769-70.
104. Id.
105. See Russell T. Brown, Class Dismissed: The Conservative ClassAction Revolution of the Texas Supreme
Court, 32 ST. MARY'S L.J. 449, 456-57 n.41 (2001) (explaining Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 is
"persuasive authority in Texas because" it served as the outline for Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42).
106. O'Connor, supra note 101, at 23; see asoJaworski, supra note 101, at 25.
20161
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debates, members recognized that in order "to have an effective class action
rule, the trial court's decision" as to "whether a true and correctly defined
class exists must be an appealable interlocutory order."' '  But the
committee noted that the legislature, not the supreme court in its rule-
making capacity, would need to enact such a law.1 0 8 As committee member
Joseph Jaworski later wrote, the determination of whether parties should be
able to appeal class certification decisions "is a policy question involving
considerations of judicial economy, the public interest i[n] avoiding
piecemeal litigation and other issues which are primarily legislative."'1 0 9 So
when the committee submitted Rule 42 to the supreme court, it did not
include a provision for immediate appeal in the proposed rule.11
In January 1978, the Administration of Justice Committee proposed to
the Texas State Bar that the trial court's decision to certify a class should be
an immediately appealable order.1 1 1 The proposed legislation became "part
of the legislative package of the ... Bar."
'1 12
When the proposal was before the 1979 legislature, a report by the House
Committee on the Judiciary described:
Rule 42 gives the court authority to determine whether a true and correctly
defined class exists. However, there are no means to appeal such a
determination and order. The [s]upreme [c]ourt was unable to provide an
appealable interlocutory order in Rule 42 because the immediate appealability
of a court order is a legislative matter (rather than an issue that could be
resolved by the [s]upreme [c]ourt in its rulemaking capacity).11 3
The report stated the "Texas State Bar recommends that the trial court's
decision on whether a class exists be an immediately appealable order" and
proposed that "[a] provision to allow temporary suspension of the trial
process in order to clarify the class issue will make class action in Texas a
more viable procedure."' 1 4 The House committee report continued:
Under current law, the trial court's determination that there is a class of
defendants might be reversed on appeal, but only after extensive discovery
and trial. Or a court's decision that there is no class necessitates that the trial
107. O'Connor, supra note 101, at 23.
108. Id.
109. Jaworski, supra note 101, at 25, 27.
110. O'Connor, supra note 101, at 23.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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proceed as a simple action when the appellate court might rule differently.
1 15
The committee concluded that interlocutory appeals of orders "certifying
or refusing to certify a class in a Rule 42 class action would be in the interest
of judicial economy."'1 1 6 The House Committee on Judiciary voted
unanimously that Senate Bill 255 pass.1 17 A legislative analysis report also
stressed the judicial economy that would result:
[Texas Revised Civil Statute article] 2250 provides for appealable
interlocutory orders in Texas, and presently only addresses the appointment
of a receiver or trustee in any cause. [118]
Rule 42, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for a class action suit.
Class action suits can be particularly costly and timely. Presently, the trial
court's determination of whether a class exists is only reviewable upon appeal
of the entire case. This creates potentially costly problems. Examples:
-trial court rules that a class exists, the case is tried with 20 or so attorneys
attending discovery and trial, and, on appeal, the decision concerning the class
is reversed
_trial court rules that no class exists, the case is tried as a simple action, and,
on appeal, the decision concerning the class is reversed
In both cases much client money, lawyer efforts and judicial time is
unnecessarily lost, and a new suit must be filed.1 19
115. Id.; see also Unnamed Members of the Class v. McMahon, 582 S.W.2d 600, 602 (Vex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ) (concluding because the determination of class action status
was not final or irrevocable, a decertification order was not a final appealable order).
116. H. Comm. on Judiciary, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 255, 66th Leg., R.S. (1979).
117. Id.
118. As noted below, prior to codification of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code in 1985, the
immediate appeal of the grant or denial of temporary injunctions was in a separate statute. See infra
Section III.
119. S. Comm. on Jurisprudence, Legislative Analysis, Tex. S.B. 255, 66th Leg., R.S. (1979); see
Ernest E. Figari Jr., Texas Civil Procedure, 34 SW. L.J. 415, 445 n.311 (1980) (explaining the need to
prevent a "waste of 'lawyer effort, client money, and judicial time' involved when a class action
determination is found to be erroneous on appeal and a retrial of the case is therefore necessary"
(quoting O'Connor, supra note 101, at 23); see also Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Kondos, 110 S.W.3d 712, 713
(Vex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.) (describing the Texas Legislature's rational for providing appeal of
an interlocutory order relating to class certification).
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The Texas Legislature's authorization in 1979 of interlocutory appeals of
class certification decisions brought about two results. First, allowance for
interlocutory appeals of class certification orders "represent[ed] a marked
departure from the general rule followed in the federal courts" that
prohibited interlocutory appeals of orders concerning class certification.1 2 0
Second, the "change effectively overrule[d]"1 2 1 a 1979 decision by the First
Court of Appeals, Unnamed Members of the Class v. McMahon,12 2 which held
that a decertification order was not a final, appealable order.1 2 3 The court
stated that "the legislature has the power to confer jurisdiction on appellate
courts to review interlocutory orders" and noted that "the legislature has
exercised this power" by enacting statutes authorizing appellate courts to
review certain orders, including orders "appointing a receiver or trustee"
and orders "refusing to vacate the appointment of a receiver or
trustee[.]"12 4 Perhaps anticipating the legislation allowing for such appeals
that passed the same month, the court expressed that the "legislature is in
the better position, after obtaining guidance from a wide variety of sources,
to determine whether class action determinations should be subject to
immediate appellate review, and we defer to legislative action. "125
III. CODIFICATION OF SECTION 51.014: CONSOLIDATING AND
CENTRALIZING INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL STATUTES
Six years later, in May 1985, the Texas Legislature adopted a
"nonsubstantive revision of the statutes relating to civil procedure and civil
remedies and liabilities" and made "conforming amendments and
repeals."1 2 6  The goal was to make "statutes 'more accessible,
understandable and usable' without altering the sense, meaning or effect of
the law."'127 The resulting Civil Practice and Remedies Code consolidated
three articles from the civil statutes authorizing interlocutory appeals,
together into section 51.014: article 2250128 permitting appeals of
120. Figari, Jr, supra note 119, at 445.
121. Id.
122. Unnamed Members of the Class v. McMahon, 582 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1979, no writ).
123. Id. at 602.
124. Id. The court also listed statutes giving interlocutory appellate jurisdiction over orders
sustaining a plea of privilege and orders granting or denying class action status in deceptive trade
practice cases. Id. Those statutes are outside the scope of this Article.
125. Id. (citing Bell v. Beneficial Consumer Disc. Co., 348 A.2d 734 (Pa. 1975)).
126. Act of May 17, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., eh. 959, 1 , 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 3242.
127. TEX. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, THIRD REVISOR'S REPORT: CIVIL PRACTICE AND
REMEDIES CODE, at i (1984).
128. Act effective Sep. 1, 1925, 39th Leg., R.S., ch. 12, art. 2250,pinted in 1 Revised vi/Statutes of
[Vol. 48:65
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interlocutory orders "appoint[ing] a receiver or trustee[]" .overrul[ing] a
motion to vacate an order ... appointing a receiver or trustee[]" or
"certify[ing] or refus[ing] to certify a class" in a class action and
articles 2251129 and 4662130 allowing appeals of orders granting, refusing, or
dissolving temporary injunctions.1 3 1 The adopted section 51.014 read:
Sec. 51.014. APPEAL FROM INTERLOCUTORY ORDER. A person may
appeal from an interlocutory order of a district court, county court at law, or
county court that:
(1) appoints a receiver or trustee;
(2) overrules a motion to vacate an order that appoints a receiver or
trustee;
(3) certifies or refuses to certify a class in a suit brought under Rule 42 of
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure; or
(4) grants or refuses or grants or overrules a motion to dissolve a
temporary injunction as provided by Chapter 65 [concerning injunctions].' 3 2
During the years after codification, the Texas Legislature "dramatic[ally]"
expanded the types of orders subject to interlocutory appeal-adding seven
types of orders to the list of appealable interlocutory orders under
section 51.014 between 1987 and 2005.133 In 2001, Justice Nathan Hecht
recognized "the recent and extensive legislative expansion of the jurisdiction
of the courts of appeals over a wider variety of interlocutory orders."1 3 4
Two years earlier, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals described "the
considerable increase of interlocutory appeals to the already overcrowded
the State of Texas, at 602, 603 (Austin, A.C. Baldwin & Sons 1925), repeaed and codfied/by Act of May 17,
1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 959, § 9, 1, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 3242, 3322, 3280 (current version at TEX.
Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(1)-(3)).
129. Id. art. 2251, at 603, repealed and codified &y Act of May 17, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 959,
9, 1, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 3242, 3322, 3280 (current version at TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE
51.014(a) (4)).
130. Id. tit. 76, ch. 1, art. 4662,printed in 2 Revised CiilStatutes of the State of Texas, at 1273, 1278
(Austin, A. C. Baldwin & Sons), repealed and codified by Act of May 17, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 959,
§ 9, 1, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 3242, 3322, 3280 (current version at TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE
51.014(a)(4)).
131. Act of May 17, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 959, 1 i, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 3242, 3280; TEX.
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, supra note 127, at i.
132. Act of May 17, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 959, § 1, sec. 51.014, 1985 Tex. Gei. Laws
3242, 3280 (current tersion at CIr. Pi c. & RILI. 51.014®(1) -(4)).
133. Frank Gilstrap, Interlocutog Appeals AfterHouse Bill4, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 1017, 1022 (2005).
134. Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Harwood, 53 S.W.3d 347, 350 (Vex. 2001) (Hecht, J., dissenting)
(first citing CIv. PRAC. &REM. § 51.014(a)(7); then citing CIV. PRAC. &REM. § 51.014(a)(8); and then
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dockets of our courts of appeals."1 3 This expansion was particularly rapid
when compared with the slower pace over the previous ninety-five years,
when the legislature authorized only four types of orders that were subject
to interlocutory appeal that later became part of section 51.014.136
A. Denials of Summagy Judgment Based on a State Official or Employee's Assertion
of Immunity
In 1989-four years after codification of section 51.014-the Texas
Legislature again added a category of interlocutory appeal to track what
Texas legislators viewed as a beneficial provision of federal law.137 This
fifth type of interlocutory appeal in section 51.014 authorized appeal of
denial of "a motion for summary judgment that is based on an assertion of
immunity by an individual who is an officer or employee of the state or a
political subdivision of the state."13
Prior to its passage, committees in the House and Senate noted the
benefits of the proposed provision. The Senate Jurisprudence Committee
reported:
135. Opv ofHouston, 5 S.W.3d at 890 n.8.
136. Yet, while the legislature expanded the types of orders subject to interlocutory appeal and-
as a result the courts of appeals experienced a "considerable increase" in interlocutory appeals on
their dockets, id., the supreme court constricted its view of its so-called "conflict jurisdiction"-
meaning its jurisdiction over interlocutory appeal of cases with holdings that conflict with prior
supreme court or appellate court decisions. Gilstrap, supra note 133, at 1021-22. Beginning in 1957
until about 1997, the supreme court narrowly construed the statutory language that granted it conflict
jurisdiction over an appealable judgment of a trial court in which a court of appeals "holds differently"
from a previous decision of the supreme court or another court of appeals. Id. at 1019-21 (noting a
broader interpretation of 'holds differently'. . . would have allowed more cases to come before the
court under the conflict jurisdiction exception"). Prior to 2003, conflict jurisdiction applied when
rulings in two cases were "so far upon the same state of facts that the decision of one case [was]
necessarily conclusive of the decision in the other." Id. at 1020-21 (quoting Dockum v. Mercury Ins.
Co., 135 S.W.2d 700, 701 (Tex. 1940)). The 2003 legislation "refined and expanded" the scope of the
supreme court's conflict jurisdiction by defining "holds differently" to include an "inconsistency in
thef respective decisions that should be clarified to remove unnecessary uncertainty in the law and
unfairness to litigants." Id. at 1024 (citation omitted); see also TEX. GOVT CODE § 22.225(e) (West
Supp. 2016) (defining the term "holds differently" in relation to interlocutory appeals); Id. § 22.001(e)
(stating the same definition of "holds differently" as applied to the Texas Supreme Court's general
jurisdiction). As a result, the supreme court's conflict jurisdiction reflected the same expanding trend
as interlocutory appeals under section 51.014.
137. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985) ("[W]e hold that a district court's denial of
a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable 'final
decision' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment.");
see also 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012) (extending jurisdiction to the federal courts of appeals from all "final
decisions" of the United States district courts).
138. Act of May 24, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 915, § 1, sec. 51.014, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 3946,
3946-47 (current version at CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 51.014(a)(5)).
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In Texas, the overruling of a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory
in nature and not appealable. In the case of a suit in which an individual who
is an employee of the state or a political subdivision of the state may be a
defendant, the employee may be able to use immunity as a defense to the suit.
If an order deHnies a motion for summary judgment based on the claim of
immunity, and ultimately immunity is found to shield the employee from
liHability, it can be argued that the employee needlessly has been put through
the trouble and turmoil of trial, and judicial resources have been wasted.
139
The House Judiciary Committee noted that the "[f]ederal [c]ourts already
recognize" allowing "individual defendants to be dismissed in their
individual capacity from suits against governmental agencies, avoiding the
trouble and turmoil of trial" as "a significant policy matter[.]" 14 0 The
House committee report explained:
Under [f]ederal law, an individual defendant who is sued for an alleged civil
rights violation is entitled to be dismissed from the suit if the plaintiff cannot
state a claim of violation of clearly established law. Because the [f]ederal
[c]ourts recognize that public officials having qualified immunity are immune
from suit, they hold that this right would be lost if they were forced to defend
a lawsuit even if their immunity to damages was eventually upheld. Therefore,
the [f]ederal [c]ourts allow an interlocutory appeal of a district court's denial
of a motion for summary judgment on immunity grounds.
14 1
The report recommended that the "[s]tate courts should also, but they claim
that their hands are tied due to the lack of legislation."1
142
Three years after passage of the law,14 3 Texas Supreme Court Justice
John Cornyn commented that "it is significant that the [1]egislature amended
Section 51.014 ... to allow a government employee an interlocutory appeal
of an order denying a summary judgment based on official immunity."144
Cornyn concluded that "[t]his rare opportunity for interlocutory appellate
review reveals just how important the legislature considers the defense of
official immunity for government employees to be."' 145  A year later, in
1993, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals stated that the "enactment of
51.014(5) signaled the importance that the legislature places on a deserving
139. S. Jurisprudence Comm., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 908, 71st Leg., R.S. (1989).
140. H. Comm. on Judiciary, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 908, 71st Leg., R.S. (1989).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Tex. S.B. 908, 71st Leg., R.S. (1989).
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government official's ability to extricate himself from litigation at its earliest
stages."
146
Cornyn also noted that qualified immunity under section 51.014(5)
affords "immunioyfrom suit, not just immunity from liability." '1 47  Cornyn
expressed that the "very reasons for ... immunity are effectively
unsalvageable if the official is determined to be immune from liability only
after a trial on the merits. "148 Citing federal authority that recognized
qualified immunity from section 1983 claims, Cornyn also spelled out the
"articulated basis for such immunity": to enable officials to avoid distraction
from their governmental duties, to avoid reticence by officials in performing
discretionary actions, to minimize deterring "able people from public
service[,]" to "avoidH the costs of an unnecessary trial[,]" and to insulate
governmental officials from burdensome discovery.
1 4 9
B. Denials of Summacy Judgment Involving Free Speech or Free Press by a Media
Defendant or a Defendant Whose Expression Appeared in Media
In 1993, the Texas Legislature added the sixth interlocutory appeal
provision to section 51.014. It allowed appeal of an interlocutory order that
denies a motion for summary judgment that is based in whole or in part upon
a claim against or defense by a member of the electronic or print media, acting
in such capacity, or a person whose communication appears in or is published
by the electronic or print media, arising under the free speech or free press
clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, or Article 1,
Section 8, of the Texas Constitution, or Chapter 73 [concerning libel].'3U
The passage evolved during the legislative process to become the lengthiest
section 51.014 interlocutory appeal provision-an evolution explored
below.
In addition to the new section 51.014 provision, the 1993 law affected
and expanded interlocutory appeals in two ways. First, it added a new
section 51.015 that provided that-solely for purposes of appeals brought
under this new section 51.014(6) provision if the appealed order "is
affirmed, the court of appeals shall order the appellant to pay all costs and
146. Ervin v. James, 874 S.W.2d 713, 717 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
147. Trats, 830 S.W.2d at 102 n.4.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Act of May 25, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 855, § 1, sec. 51.014, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 3365,
3366 (amended 2003) (current version at TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(6)).
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reasonable attorney fees of the appeal[.]"1 5 1 But if it is not affirmed, each
party would be responsible for its own costs.1 52 Second, the law amended
section 22.225 of the Government Code, which stated that "a judgment of
a court of appeals is conclusive on the law and facts" in various types of
cases, and listed exceptions where a writ of error was allowed from the
supreme court.1 5 3 The 1993 law added a new provision allowing a writ of
error "from the supreme court for an appeal from an interlocutory order
described by Section 51.014(6) [.],154
Two aspects of the legislative process leading to passage of
section 51.014(6) are notable. First, legislators amended this proposed
legislation more than any previous legislation enacting a section 51.014
interlocutory appeal provision.1 5 5 As noted, these amendments resulted in
the lengthiest subsection of section 51.014.16 Second, and relatedly, the
wording and focus of the provision at the beginning and end of the
legislative process were substantially different. The original Senate bill, as
introduced in February 1993, provided only for the addition of section
51.014(6) and for writs of error to the supreme court from interlocutory
orders under section 51.014(6) (the amendments to Government Code
section 22.225).57 The original wording of section 51.014(6), as
introduced in the Senate in February 1993, allowed appeal of an
interlocutory order that
denies a motion for summary judgment that is based on a claim, or defense
to a claim, for defamation, libel, or slander, or a claim, or defense to a claim,
arising from a broadcast or written publication.
15 8
The bill was then referred to the Senate Committee on State Affairs,
which-a week later-reported the bill favorably to the Senate with two
amendments. First, it completely rewrote subsection (6) to read largely in
151. Id. § 1, sec. 51.015, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws at 3366 (current version at TEX. CIV. PRAC. &REM.
CODE § 51.015).
152. Id.
153. Id. § 2, sec. 22.225, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws at 3366 (current version at GOVT § 22.225(b)).
154. Id. (amended 2003) (current version at GOVT § 22.225(d)).
155. See Actions: SB 76, 73rd Regular Session, LEGIS. REFERENCE LIBR. TEX.,
http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/legis/bilSearch/acti6ons.cfm?legSession=73-0&billtypeDetail=
SB&billNumberDetail= 76&billSuffixDetail= &startRow= l&iDlist= &unClicklist=&number= 100
(last visited Nov. 12, 2016) (providing the relevant dates of legislative action on Senate Bill 76).
156. Act of May 25, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 855, § 1, sec. 51.014, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws
3365, 3366 (current version at Civ. PRAC. & REM. § 51.014(a)(6)).
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the form that the legislature ultimately enacted. It allowed appeal of an
interlocutory order that
denies a motion for summary judgment that is based in whole or in part upon
a claim against or defense by a member of the electronic or print media arising
under the free speech or free press clause of the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution, or Article 1, Section 8, of the Texas Constitution,
or Chapter 73, Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
159
The legislation veered from the original broad focus on denials of summary
judgment related to "defamation, libel, or slander" claims or "arising from
a broadcast or written publication" to a more media-centric focus. All of
the witnesses who testified before the Senate Committee on State Affairs
favored the bill; 160  several of these witnesses represented media
organizations, including the Belo Corporation, the Round Rock Leader, the
Texas Press Association, the Texas Daily Newspaper Association, and the
Texas Association of Broadcasters.16 1 Second, the Senate Committee on
State Affairs added section 51.015, which provided that each party was liable
for its own costs for an appeal under section 51.014(6).162
Numerous additional amendments followed. Senators made two
amendments from the floor on the bill's second reading. One amendment
added the qualifier that the "members of the electronic or print media" must
be "acting in such capacity[.]"' 1 6 3  A second amendment expanded the
statute to apply not only to claims by or against a member of the media, but
also to claims by or against "a person whose communication appears in or
is published by the electronic or print media[.]"'1 6 4 An explanatory note
accompanying the second amendment stated the amendment "would
extend the right to an interlocutory appeal to persons other than members
of the media in certain circumstances[,]" including, for example, "persons
who have letters or op-ed pieces published in newspapers or magazines or
who express their opinions on radio or television programs. " 165  In
159. S. Comm. on State Affairs, Committee Report, Tex. S.B. 76, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993),
http://www.lIrl.state.tx.us/LASDOCS/73R/SB76/SB76_73R.pdf#page=4.
160. The committee report indicates that all witnesses were "for" the proposed legislation,
although the report does not indicate whether the witnesses were "for" the bill in its original introduced
form or if they were "for" the bill as amended by the committee. Id. (listing the votes of the witnesses).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. S.J. of Tex., 73d Leg., R.S. 302 (1993) (Floor Amendment No. One by Senator Turner).
164. Id. at 312 (Floor Amendment No. Two by Senator Turner).




St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 48 [2017], No. 1, Art. 3
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol48/iss1/3
INTERLOCUTORYAPPEALS IN TExAS: A HISTORY
addition, the House Committee on judicial Affairs amended section 51.015
to provide that, if the appealed order is affirmed, the court of appeals shall
order the appellant to pay "all costs and reasonable attorneys' fees of the
appeal;" otherwise, each party would pay their own costs of the appeal.
166
All of these amendments became part of the enacted law.
167
The bill analyses produced by the Senate Research Center and the House
Research Organization reflect the evolution of section 51.014(6) during the
legislative process. The Senate Research Center bill analysis described the
purpose in terms of the original, enrolled bill: "As proposed, [Senate Bill] 76
authorizes parties to appeal interlocutory orders denying a motion for
summary judgment in cases involving defamation, libel, or slander, or arising
from a broadcast or written publication."11 68  The House Research
Organization bill analysis, in contrast, reflected the media-focus of the
amended bill. The bill analysis stated that supporters of the amended bill
noted it "would allow a newspaper, radio station or television station that
was sued for libel to make an immediate appeal of a judge's refusal to grant
a summary judgment[.]"'1 69 The House Research Organization also noted
the position of supporters of the bill:
The free-speech and free-press rights of print and electronic media can be
seriously eroded by the costs and management time involved in defending
libel suits, even though about 75 percent of jury verdicts against the media are
overturned or reduced on appeal. These reversals, which are generally based
166. H. Comm. on Judicial Affairs, Committee Report, Tex. S.B. 76, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993). The
House Committee on Judicial Affairs also amended the bill to provide that it would not apply to "any
matters in litigation prior to the effective date of the [A]ct." Id. The nine witnesses who testified or
registered in support of the bill before the House committee largely mirrored the witnesses who
appeared at the Senate committee hearing--and several represented media. Compare H. Comm. on
Judicial Affairs Minutes 2, 73d Leg., R.S. (March 30, 1993), http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/
scanned/legisCmteMinutes/houseCmtes/73-O/Judicial Affairs/03301993.pdf (listing witnesses
including representatives of the Texas Press Association, Texas Association of Broadcasters, and Texas
Daily Newspaper Association), with S. Comm. on State Affairs, Committee Report, Tex. S.B. 76, 73d
Leg., R.S. (1993), http://www.Irl.state.tx.us/LASDOCS/73R/SB76/SB76_73R.pdf#page=4 (listing
witnesses including representatives of the Texas Daily Newspaper Association, the Round Rock
Leader, and the Texas Press Association). One represented the Texas Trial Lawyers Association. H.
Comm. on Judicial Affairs Minutes 2, 73d Leg., R.S. (March 30, 1993), http://
www.Irl.state.tx.us/scanned/legisCmteMinutes/houseCmtes/73- /Judicial Affairs/03301993.pdf.
167. Act of May 25, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 855, § 1, sec. 51.014, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 3365,
336546 (current version at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(6)).
168. S. Research Ctr., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 76, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993). The Senate Research
Center produced four versions of the bill analysis on Senate Bill 76 between February and August 1993,
primarily reflecting amendments to the proposed legislation. The wording of the "Purpose" section
of the bill analysis did not change from the first version of the bill analysis from February.
169. H. Research Org., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 76, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993).
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on constitutional issues, occur only after the media has incurred substantial
expenses of defending against the suit. [Senate Bill] 76 would permit the
courts to sort out unmeritorious libel cases before a case enters the time-
consuming and expensive trial phase.
170
Two years later, the First Court of Appeals in Houston noted the same
purpose: "The rationale for the statute was to save the time and expense of
a trial on the merits when the media may be entitled to a constitutional or
statutory privilege."11 7 1 Yet case law decided during the years immediately
after passage of section 51.014(6) in 1993 also reflected a desire by litigants
to stretch the wording of the Section so that it applied broadly-or, in other
words, applied as originally written. The broadest case challenging
section 51.014(6)'s constitutionality based on its application to the media
was KTRK Television, Inc. v. Fowkes,1 72 before the First Court of Appeals in
1998.173 Fowkes and his wife sued a television station and reporter for libel
based on statements in a news report alleging that Fowkes was withholding
documents sought by a reporter.1 74  The television station and reporter
appealed the trial court's denial of their motion for summary judgment
under section 51.014(6).17' Fowkes challenged the constitutionality of
section 51.014(6) on three grounds;17 6 the court denied all three. Fowkes
argued that section 51.014(6) was a "special law" under the Texas
Constitution because it benefited one group-the media-without a
reasonable basis for the classification and did not apply equally to all parties
170. Id.
171. Grant v. Wood, 916 S.W.2d 42,46 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ). Another
issue before the courts was whether section 51.014(6) applied to cases filed before the effective date
of the section, September 1, 1993, based on the wording of the enacting legislation. Id. at 45 n.2
(declining to address the application of section 51.014(6) when "the underlying suit was filed before
the effective date of the 1993 [Act]" because of the inappropriateness of addressing the issue in the
mandamus proceeding (citing Act of May 25, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 855, § 1, sec. 51.014, 1993 Tex.
Gen. Laws 3365, 3366 (current version at CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 51.014(a)(6)). Because of the added
provision that the section would not apply to "any matters in litigation prior to the effective date of
the [A]ct[,]" courts held that the section did not apply to any cases filed prior to September 1, 1993,
even if a court issued the appealed order after September 1, 1993. Time Warner Ent. Co. v. Hebert,
916 S.W.2d 47, 48 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ); H & C Commc'ns, Inc. v. Reeds
Foot Intl, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 475, 476 (Vex. App.-San Antonio 1994, no writ).
172. KTRK Television, Inc. v. Fowkes, 981 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998,
pet. denied), disqppro ed on other ground by Turjer v. 1-7 Telezision, lnc., 38 S.W.3d 103, 115-16 (Tex.
2000).
173. Id. at 783-86.
174. Id. at 782-83.
175. Id. at 783.
176. Id. at 784.
[Vol. 48:65
28
St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 48 [2017], No. 1, Art. 3
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol48/iss1/3
INTERLOCUTORYAPPEALS IN TExAS: A HISTORY
within the class.1 7 7 The court concluded that the classification was
reasonable because section 51.014(6) "preserves the freedom of the press"
by permitting "media defendants to appeal and obtain an immediate ruling
on constitutional issues without incurring substantial expense."' 8 Fowkes
argued that the law did not apply equally "because the class completely
excludes non-media libel defendants."17 9 However, the court concluded
that the statute created a "class" of media defendants and that "[n]on-media
libel defendants are simply excluded from the class."1 8 0 The court also
concluded that the law does not violate the open courts provision of the
Texas Constitution because it does not place unreasonable financial barriers
on libel victims.1 8 1 Among other reasons, the court reasoned that, if the
media defendant loses the interlocutory appeal, the defendant must pay the
plaintiffs attorney's fees and costs; if the media defendant wins the
interlocutory appeal, "the plaintiff saves the costs and attorney's fees of a
[full] trial and subsequent appeal."1" 2 In addition, the court concluded that
section 51.014(6) does not place an unreasonable burden on non-media libel
plaintiffs when balanced against the purpose of the statute of ensuring "that
the chilling effect of protracted litigation will not diminish the free exchange
of ideas guaranteed by the Texas and United States Constitutions. "183
Lastly, the court concluded that section 51.014(6) does not violate the equal
protection guarantees in the United States and Texas Constitutions:
The legislature has enacted the statute in question to eliminate the chilling
effect that the threat of extended litigation has upon te exercise of the
protections secured by the First Amendment. The state has a legitimate
purpose in furthering our national commitment to the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. The distinction
between media libel defendants and non-media libel defendants created by the
legislature is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.
184
177. Id.; see also TEX. CONST. art. III, § 56 (prescribing the Texas Legislature from enacting a
"special law" of various enumerated types or "in all other cases where a general law can be made
applicable").
178. KTRK Teertsion, 981 S.W.2d at 784.
17 9. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 785; see also TEX. CONST. aft. I, § 13 ("All courts shall be open, and every person for an
injury done to him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.").
182. KTRK Tekvision, 981 S.W.2d at 785.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 786; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (stating no state shall deny any person equal
protection of the laws); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3 ("All free men, when they form a social compact, have
equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or
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In other cases, plaintiffs argued that section 51.014(6) applied to them,
although they were non-media litigants. In a 1997 case before the
Thirteenth Court of Appeals and a 1998 case before the Eighth Court of
Court of Appeals, plaintiffs who sued the media for defamation argued that
section 51.014(6) enabled them to appeal an interlocutory order denying
them summary judgment.1 8 5 Both courts of appeals similarly stated that
"[w]hile that is indeed an avenue of interpretation, the legislative history of
the statute reveals that Section 51.014(6) [is] not intended to inure to the
benefit of a plaintiff who claim[s] to have been libeled or slandered by the
media."' 18 6 Instead, both courts quoted the House Research Organization
bill analysis and noted that the purpose of section 51.014(6) is to grant an
immediate appeal of a denial of summary judgment to media defendants
that are sued for libel.
1 8 7
C. Grant or Denial of a Special Appearance and Grant or Denial of a Plea to the
Jurisdiction by a Governmental Unit
In 1997, the Texas Legislature enacted the seventh and eighth types of
interlocutory appeal under section 51.014: appeals of interlocutory orders
granting or denying a special appearance or granting or denying a plea to the
jurisdiction by a governmental unit.1 8 8  Because passage of the two
provisions was interrelated, this Article discusses them both in this section.
The 1997 legislation amended section 51.014 in three ways. First, the
legislation added two types of interlocutory appeals to section 51.014.
Litigants could appeal an interlocutory order that:
(7) grants or denies the special appearance of a defendant under Rule 120a,
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, except in a suit brought under the Family
Code; or
(8) grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit as that
term is defined in Section 101.001.189
This 1997 legislation also inserted Subsection "(a)" before the listing of
the types of appealable interlocutory orders in section 51.014 and created
privileges, but in consideration of public services.").
185. TSM AM-FM TV v. Meca Homes, Inc., 969 S.W.2d 448, 451 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1998,
pet. denied); Rogers v. Cassidy, 946 S.W.2d 439, 443 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1997, no writ).
186. TSM, 969 S.W.2d at 451; see Rogers, 946 S.W.2d at 443.
187. TSM, 969 S.W.2d at 451; Rogers, 946 S.W.2d at 443.
188. Act of May 27,1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1296, § 1, sec. 51.014(a), 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 4936,
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subsection "(b)" which provided:
(b) An interlocutory appeal under Subsection (a) shall have the effect of
staying the commencement of a trial in the trial court pending resolution of
the appeal.190
The original bill introduced in the Senate included subsection (7),
concerning special appearance rulings (although it did not mention the
exclusion of orders in suits under the Texas Family Code).19 1 But it
contained an entirely different subsection (8)-and no mention of orders
on pleas to the jurisdiction by government entities.192  The original
subsection (8) allowed appeal of an interlocutory order that "grants or
denies a motion to join a responsible third party under section 33.004."' 193
The Senate Committee on jurisprudence substituted a new bill that (a) kept
the original section concerning orders granting or denying a special
appearance and added the qualifier "except in a suit brought under the
Family Code"; (b) included the original section concerning orders granting
or denying a motion to join a responsible third party; and (c) added a third
new subsection to 51.0141subsection (a)(9)-allowing appeals of orders
granting or denying pleas "to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit."
'1 94
At the committee hearing, a representative of the Texas Association of
Defense Counsel testified in favor of the bill, while representatives of the
Texas Trial Lawyers Association testified against it. 195 Then, during its
second reading on the floor, the Senate adopted an amendment proposed
by Senator Robert Duncan, the sponsor of the bill, to delete the proposed
subsection (a)(8) allowing appeal from interlocutory orders concerning
joinder of a responsible third party.1 96 Although the two additions to
190. Id. § 1, sec. 51.014(a)- (), 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws at 4937 (current version at CIV. PRAC. &
REM. § 51.014(a)- ()).
191. Tex. S.B. 453, 75thLeg., R.S. (1997) (introduced version).
192. Compare id. (failing to mention pleas to the jurisdiction by governmental units), with Act of
May 27, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1296, § 1, sec. 51.014(a), 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 4936, 4937 (current




193. Tex. S.B. 453, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997) (introduced version); see also CIV. PRAc. &REM. CODE
ANN. § 33.004 (West. Supp. 2016) (prescribing procedural rules for joining responsible third parties).
194. S. Comm. on Jurisprudence, Committee Substitute, Tex. S.B. 453, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997).
The bill also provided that interlocutou appeals of orders granting or denying a motion to join a
responsible third party "may not be brought after the 90th day after the filing of the original answer by
the defendant or defendants." Id
195. S. Comm. on Jurisprudence, Witness List, Tex. S.B. 453, 75th Leg., R.S. (Feb. 24, 1997).
196. S.J. of Tex., 75th Leg., R.S. 834 (1997) (Floor Amendment No. One by Senator Duncan).
The Senate also adopted Senator Duncan's floor amendment to omit the associated subsection-
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section 51.014(a) concerning special appearances and pleas to the
jurisdiction were related, their origins differed.
1. Special Appearance
The impetus for enacting legislation allowing interlocutory appeals of
rulings on special appearances arose from a 1996 Texas Supreme Court
decision, CSR Ltd. v. Link.1 9 7 Prior to CSR, the Texas Supreme Court held
that "mandamus typically will not lie from the denial of a special
appearance" because "in the ordinary case no circumstances apart from the
increased cost and delay of trial and appeal are present[.]"'1 9 But in CSR,
the Texas Supreme Court held that-under the circumstances of that case-
mandamus relief was appropriate where a trial court had improperly denied
a special appearance motion.1 9 9 The court concluded:
While the question of personal jurisdiction is remediable by appeal in most
cases, we hold that under the circumstances of this case, the concerns of
judicial efficiency in mass tort litigation combined with the magnitude of the
potential risk for mass tort actions against the defendant makes ordinary
appeal inadequate.2 0 0
When the legislature met during the year following the CSR decision, the
House and Senate bill analyses of the Senate bill proposing
sections 51.014(7) and (8), discussed CSR.201 The Senate Research Center
bill analysis stated, "The writ was issued [in the CSR case] because Texas
law does not allow an interlocutory appeal for a special appearance."20 2 The
report by the House Committee on Civil Practices noted, "This bill provides
a solution by allowing interlocutory appeals from an order granting or
denying a special appearance. "203
Four and a half months after the Act went into effect, in Raymond Overseas
subsection (I)-requiring that appeals of orders concerning joinder of responsible third parties be
brought within ninety days of the filing of the first answer. Id.
197. CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. 1996).
198. Id. at 597 (citing Canadian Helicopters Ltd. v. Wittig, 876 S.W.2d 304, 307 (Tex. 1994)).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See H. Research Org., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 453, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997) ("[R]ecently the
court issued a writ of mandamus for the denial of a special appearance motion." (citing CSR, 925
S.W.2d at 597)).
202. S. Research Ctr., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 453, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997) (concerning enrolled
version).
203. H. Comm. on Civ. Practices, Committee Report, Tex. S.B. 453, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997).
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Ho/di g Ltd. v. Clu , 4 the Second Court of Appeals considered the
availability of mandamus relief after the Act "created an interlocutory
remedy other than mandamus when a trial court grants or denies a special
appearance."20 5 The court denied Raymond Overseas's request in a motion
for rehearing to construe its mandamus petition as an interlocutory
appeal.20 6 The court concluded, "When an interlocutory appeal is available,
the 'extraordinary circumstances' dictating mandamus relief from the denial
of a special appearance usually will not be present if the interlocutory appeal
is an adequate remedy. "207
2. Plea to the Jurisdiction by a Governmental Unit
The stimulus for including the second new category of interlocutory
appeal-an order that "grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a
governmental unit"20 8  in the 1997 law is less clear. But the House
Research Organization, in describing supporters' arguments for the
proposed bill, outlined the relationship between the two new interlocutory
appeal provisions. It described how "[d]eterminations of personal
jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction are at the heart of a court's ability
to hear a case[,]" but that "there [was] currently no procedure for appealing
the decision of the trial court on these important issues until after a
judgment is rendered."' 20 9 The House Research Organization bill analysis
also noted that "incorrect rulings on such decisions needlessly waste the
time of the courts and can cost litigants hundreds of thousands of dollars as
they defend cases which should have been dismissed."'2 10 The bill analysis
stated that the reason the bill would "allow a governmental entity's denial of
a plea to the jurisdiction to be taken up on an interlocutory appeal [was]
because such entities would be wasting taxpayer money defending a suit in
which the court lacked jurisdiction. "211
But the House Research Organization limited the application of the plea
204. Raymond Overseas Holding, Ltd v. Curry, 955 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997,
no pet.).
205. Id. at 471.
206. Id. at 472.
207. Id. at 471 (quoting CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 596 (Tex. 1996)).
208. Act ofMay 27,1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1296, § 1, sec. 51.014(a), 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 4936,
4937 (current version at TEX. CIv. PREAc. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(8)).
209. H. Research Org., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 453, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997).
210. Id.
211. Id. The House Research Organization bill analysis also noted opponents' complaint that,
because "the defendant in these cases would be governmental entities with resources superior to many
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to the jurisdiction provision. Without stating a basis for its position, it
contended that "to avoid overloading the appellate courts with having to
rule on routine motions, the bill would limit subject matter jurisdiction
interlocutory appeals to cases involving government entities sued under the
Tort Claims Act." '2 1 2 The following year, in 1998, parties before the Third
Court of Appeals cited statements from the House Research Organization
bill analysis, from the legislative hearing testimony by the bill's sponsor, and
from an assistant attorney general to buttress their claim that the Civil
Practice and Remedies Code "allows such interlocutory appeals only when
the asserted lack of jurisdiction in the trial court is based on sovereign
immunity." '2 1 3 Nevertheless, the court concluded the language of the
statute did not limit these appeals to only orders concerning pleas of
jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity.2 14 The court also concluded that
the cited legislative hearing testimony did not address the limits of
section 51.014(a)(8).2 ' Additionally, the court noted that (1) the statement
from the House Research Organization bill analysis was from the section
stating arguments by bill supporters, and (2) the Senate and House
committee reports did not discuss restricting the provision to pleas
involving sovereign immunity.2 1 6 The court concluded "[t]he legislative
history here is not sufficiently clear or compelling to require us to add a
restriction to the statute that the legislature did not provide."21 7
D. Expert Reports in Health Care Liabiliy C/aims
Six years later, in 2003, two new amendments to section 51.014 reflected
a primary priority of that legislative session: tort reform. A report by the
House Committee on Civil Practices reflected these concerns:
Texas faces a general environment of excessive litigation. This has
resulted in a crisis in access to healthcare as medical providers leave the
state or leave the profession altogether. It has also resulted in higher
costs to patients and consumers, caused companies to locate outside of
Texas, disproportionately burdened Texas courts, and even forced
some companies into bankruptcy.
218
212. Id.
213. City of Austin v. L.S. Ranch, Ltd., 970 S.W.2d 750, 752 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, no pet.).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 752-53.
216. Id. at 753.
217. Id.
218. H. Comm. on Civ. Practices, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003).
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The Texas Legislature attempted to address these conditions with House
Bill 4, major tort reform legislation that included revisions to
section 51.014.219 As the House Committee on Civil Practices expressed,
"[House Bill] 4 is a comprehensive civil justice reform bill intended to
address and correct problems that currently impair the fairness and
efficiency of our court system. "220
The enacted version of House Bill 4 spanned over fifty pages of the Texas
General Laws and included numerous procedural and jurisdictional changes
to interlocutory appeals (some concerning section 51.014 and some not),
including broadening the conflict jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of
Texas over interlocutory appeals.2 2 1 Two provisions near the beginning of
the wide-ranging legislation concerned section 51.014. First, the bill
expanded the types of interlocutory appeals for which a petition of review
could be filed in the supreme court to include an appeal from an
interlocutory order that certifies or refuses to certify a class in a class action
lawsuit (under section 51.014(a)(3)).22 2 As a result, under House Bill 4, as
enacted, a petition for review to the supreme court was permitted for two
types of appeals of interlocutory orders: orders concerning class certification
and orders denying summary judgment to media defendants or people
whose communication appeared in the media on First Amendment grounds
219. See S. Research Ctr., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003) (suggesting, at
section 1.03 in the engrossed version, amendments to subsections 51.014(a), (b), and (c) of the Civil
Practice and Remedies Code).
220. H. Comm. on Civ. Practices, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003). House Bill 4
was "comprehensive." As the Senate Research Center described in its bill analysis, House Bill 4
"contains elements addressing: class action lawsuits, offers of settlement, venue and forum non
conveniens, proportionate responsibility, products liability, interest, appeal bonds, seat belts, medical
malpractice, charitable immunity and liability, admissibility of evidence regarding nursing homes,
liability relating to asbestos claims, and assignment of judges in health care liability claims." S. Research
Ctr., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003).
221. Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 847; see Gilstrap, supra
note 133, at 1017-18 (explaining the jurisdictional and procedural changes to interlocutory appeals in
House Bill 4); Claudia Wilson Frost &J. Brett Busby, HB4s NewAppellate Ruks: InterlocutogAppeals and
Stays, Conflict Juisdiction, Judgment Interest, and Stays of Foreign Judgments, 16 APP. ADVOC., Fall 2003, at 6,
6-9 (describing how House Bill 4 changed the law concerning interlocutory appeals, including conflict
jurisdiction).
222. Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, § 1.02, sec. 22.225(d), 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws
847, 848-49 (amended 2005) (currentversion atTEX. GOV'T CODE § 22.225(d)). The Act also clarified
that not only does the filing of an interlocutory appeal under any of the subsections of section 51.014
(except for appeal of an order concerning temporary injunctions) "stays the commencement of a trial"
pending resolution of the interlocutory appeal, but that interlocutory appeals of orders concerning class
certification, immunity of officers or employees of the state, or a governmental unit's plea to the
jurisdiction under section 51.014 also stay all other trial court proceedings. Id. § 1.03, sec. 51.014(b),
2003 Tex. Gen. Laws at 849 (amended 2013) (current version at CIv. PRAC. & REM. § 51.014(b)).
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(under section 51.014(a)(6)).2 23 Second, the law added two types of orders
that were subject to interlocutory appeal:
An order that "denies all or part of the relief sought by a motion" under Civil
Practice and Remedies Code Section 74.351(b) which allows "a defendant
physician or health care provider" to file a motion for a trial court to dismiss
a health care liability claim and award the "physician or health care provider
reasonable attorney's fees and costs of court" on the ground that the claimant
did not timely file a required expert report.
22 4
An order that "grants relief sought by a motion under Section 74.351()"-
which states that a "court shall grant a motion challenging the adequacy of an
expert report only if it appears to the court, after hearing, that the report does
not represent an objective good faith effort to comply with the" requirements
for an expert report.
2 2 5
The original version of House Bill 4, introduced in February 2003,
included less comprehensive revisions concerning section 51.014 than the
version that the legislature eventually enacted. The original version only
included provisions concerning section 51.014 that related to class action
suits. 2 2 6 The original bill did not include the two new types of interlocutory
appeals concerning expert reports in health care liability claims that were in
the final version.227
In late February 2003-nine days after the bill's introduction-the House
Committee on Civil Practices considered the bill in a public hearing and
heard testimony from over twenty witnesses, who were about evenly divided
between those who favored the bill and those who opposed it.228 Those in
favor included representatives of the Texas Civil Justice League and Texans
for Lawsuit Reform while representatives of the Texas Trial Lawyers
223. Id. § 1.02, sec. 22.225(d), 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws at 849 (current version at GOV'T§ 22.225(d)).
224. Id. § 1.03, sec. 51.014(a), 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws at 849 (current version at CIV. PRAC. &REM.
§ 51.014(a)(9)); see also CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(b) (West Supp. 2016). The law also
provided that "an appeal may not be taken from an order granting an extension under Section 74.351."
Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, § 1.03, sec. 51.014(a), 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 847, 849
(current version at CIv. PRAc. & REM. § 51.014(a)(9)).
225. Id. (current version at Civ. PRAC. & REM. § 51.014(a)(10)) (emphasis added); see also id.
§74.351().
226. Tex. H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003) (introduced version).
227. Compare i. (addressing only section 51.014(b)), with Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S.,
ch. 204, § 1.03, sec. 51.014(a), 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 847, 849 (adding Section 51.014(a)(9) and (10)).
228. See H. Comm. on Civ. Practices, Witness List, Tex. H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S. (Feb. 26, 2003),
htp://www.capitol.state.tx.us/todocs/78R/witlistmtg/html/C1002003022614001.HTM (listing
eleven witnesses "for" the bill and ten witnesses "against" it).
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Association and Texas Municipal League Intergovernmental Risk Pool were
among those opposed.2 2 9 A week later, the committee reconvened and
considered and recommended to the House a substituted committee version
of the bill that incorporated numerous revisions.2 30 These included the
addition of the two types of orders (concerning health care liability claim
expert reports) subject to interlocutory appeal under section 51.014.231 The
House and Senate ultimately passed-with some slight revision-the
"Complete Committee Substitute" recommended by the House Committee
on Civil Practices, including the new section 51.014(a) provisions.2 3 2
229. Id. Numerous witnesses representing groups or themselves also appeared before the Senate
Committee on State Affairs. Some of these witnesses included representatives from similar groups
that appeared before the House Civil Practices Committee, with representatives of the Texas Civil
Justice League and Texans for Lawsuit Reform among the supporters and those opposed including
representatives of the Texas Trial Lawyers Association. S. Comm. on State Affairs, Witness List, Tex.
H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S. (Apr. 7, 2003), http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/78R/witlistmtg/
html/C5702003040708001.HTM; S. Comm. on State Affairs, Witness List, Tex. H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S.
(Apr. 10, 2003), http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/78R/witlistmtg/html/C5702003041008001
.HTM; S. Comm. on State Affairs, Witness List, Tex. H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S. (Apr. 14, 2003),
htp://www.capitol.state.tx.us/todocs/78R/witistmtg/html/C5702003041408001.HTM; S. Comm.
on State Affairs, Witness List, Tex. H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S. (Apr. 15, 2003), http://www.capitol.
state.tx.us/ tlodocs/7 8R/witlistmtg/html/ C5 702003041508001.HTM; S. Comm. on State Affairs,
Witness List, Tex. H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S. (Apr. 16, 2003), http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/
tlodocs/78R/witlistmtg/html/C5702003041608001.HTM; S. Comm. on State Affairs, Witness List,
Tex. H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S. (Apr. 22, 2003), http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/78R/witlistmtg/
html/C5702003042208001.HTM; S. Comm. on State Affairs, Witness List, Tex. H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S.
(May 5, 2003), http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/78R/witlistmtg/html/C5702003050508001.
HTM; S. Comm. on State Affairs, Witness List, Tex. H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S. (May 6,2003), http://www.
capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/78R/witlistmtg/html/C5702003050608001.HTM; S. Comm. on State
Affairs, Witness List, Tex. H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S. (May 7, 2003), http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/
tlodocs/78R/witlistmtg/html/C5702003050708001.HTM.
230. See H. Comm. on Civ. Practices, Recommitted Committee Report, H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S.
(2003) (detailing the revisions made to House Bill 4 by the House Committee on Civil Practices); H.
Comm. on Civ. Practices, Committee Report, H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003) (providing a "Summary of
Committee Action").
231. See H. Comm. on Civ. Practices, Recommitted Committee Report, H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S.
(2003) (proposing subsections (9) and (10) as additions to section 51.014).
232. H. Comm. on Civ. Practices, Committee Report, H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003) (providing a
"Summary of Committee Action" and showing the "[c]ommittee substitute" as being "[r]eported
favorably" on March 4, 2003). On the bill's second reading, the House adopted numerous floor
amendments, including amendments proposed by the sponsor of House Bill 4,
Representative Joe Nixon. See Actions: HB 4, 78th Regular Session, LEGIS. REFERENCE. LIBR. TEX.,
http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/legis/billSearch/actions.cfm?legSession=78-
0&billtypeDetail=HB&billNumberDetail= 4&billSuffixDetail= &startRow= 1&IDlist=&unClicklist=
&number=100 (last visited Nov. 12, 2016) (listing the dates of legislative action on House Bill 4).
Nixon's floor amendments expanded the reach of section 51.014(c) so that an interlocutory appeal of
an order concerning the immunity of a state official under section 51.014(a)(5) and pleas to the
jurisdiction under section 51.014(a)(8) (along with orders concerning class action certification under
section 51.014(a)(3)) stayed all proceedings in the trial court-not just the commencement of trial. H.J.
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The two new types of interlocutory appeals under section 51.014-
allowing interlocutory appeal of rulings concerning expert reports in health
care liability cases-related to and supported "[a] primary goal of the 78th
[Texas] Legislature": "reform the law of medical malpractice." '2 3 3 The
legislature expressed its concerns about "a medical malpractice insurance
crisis in Texas" in its findings in the legislation: "The Legislature of the State
of Texas" found that "the number of health care liability claims (frequency)
ha[d] increased since 1995 inordinately[.]"'2 3 4 As a result of medical liability
filings and payments by insurers, there was a resulting "serious public
problem in availability of and affordability of adequate medical professional
liability insurance" that "increased the cost of medical care both directly
through fees and indirectly through additional services provided for
protection against future suits or claims[.]" 2 35 The legislature stated that, in
light of these conditions, it passed article 10 of House Bill 4 for the purpose
of-among other things-reducing "excessive frequency and severity of
health care liability claims through reasonable improvements and
modifications in the Texas insurance, tort, and medical practice
systems."2 3 6
In Article 10, "the legislature repealed the Medical Liability and Insurance
Improvement Act of 1977 and replaced it with a new chapter 74 of the Civil
Practice and Remedies Code entitled 'Medical Liability. ' '237  The new
section 74.351 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code implemented "a
of Tex., 78th Leg., R.S. 802-03 (2003) (Floor Amendment No. Three by Representative Joe Nixon).
The House and Senate fine-tuned the provisions, incorporating slight additional revisions, before final
passage. These revisions included (1) changing the references in the new section 51.014(a)(9) and
(a)(10) from the previous Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act of Texas in the civil
statutes to the newly enacted Medical Liability Act under Civil Practice and Remedies Code
section 74.351; (2) adding a closing phrase to subsection (a)(9) so that it read in full: "[Subsection] (9)
denies all or part of the relief sought by a motion under Section 74.351(b), except that an appeal may
not be taken from an order granting an extension under Section 74.351"; and (3) allowing for the stay
of all trial court proceedings in interlocutory appeals of orders concerning class certification, orders
denying summary judgment based on official immunity, and orders concerning a plea to the jurisdiction
by a governmental unit. H. & S., Final Conf. Comm. Report, H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003); see also S.
Comm. on State Affairs, Committee Substitute, H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003) (recommending a
substituted version to the engrossed House version of the bill); Tex. H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003)
(engrossed version) (representing the House version of the bill).
233. Gilstrap, supra note 133, at 1025-26.
234. Act ofJune 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, § 10.11(a)(1), 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 847, 884.
235. Id. 10.11(a)(4), (9), 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws at 884.
236. Id. f 10.11(b)(1), 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws at 884.
237. Gilstrap, supra note 133, at 1025; see § 10.01, 10.09, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws at 864, 884
(amending chapter 74 to include the Medical Liability Act and repealing the Medical Liability and
Insurance Improvement Act of Texas); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ch. 74 (West Supp. 2016)
(codifying the Medical Liability Act).
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revised procedure for expert reports in health care liability cases."2 3 And
the enactment of two new interlocutory appeals provisions in
section 51.014(a)(9) and (10) made trial court rulings concerning those
expert reports subject to interlocutory appeal.2 3 9 As Justice Priscilla Owen
described in a 2004 concurrence and dissent, "the [l]egislature amended
section 51.014 ... to provide for an interlocutory appeal if a trial court
refuses to dismiss a health care liability claim when an expert's statement
does not meet the statutory standards."'2 40 Justice Owen concluded, "This
is another unmistakable statement of public policy that the [l]egislature does
not want health care liability cases to proceed through the legal system if the
threshold requirement of an expert report has not been met. ' 2 4 1 As a result,
the legislature used the interlocutory appeal mechanism as an instrument
"[i]n an effort to stem frivolous suits against health care providers[.]"242
E. Denial of a Motion to Dismiss a C/aim Related to Asbestos and Si,ca Exposure
At the next legislative session in 2005, the Texas Legislature again
employed the interlocutory appeal mechanism as a tool to address a tort
reform issue:2 43 an "asbestos litigation crisis" and the "precipitous " rise in
claims of "silica-related disease [.]"244 Proponents of tort reform
238. Gilstrap, supra note 133, at 1026; see CIV. PR/AC. & REM. § 74.351 (mandating procedural
requirements for filing expert reports "[i]n a health care liability claim" against a "physician or health
care provider' with consequences-such as awarding the "affected physician or health care provider
reasonable attorney's fees" and dismissing the claim for failure to follow the requirements). Since
1995, Texas law had required a plaintiff-in a health care liability suit to submit an "early expert report[.]"
Lewis v. Funderbunk, 253 S.W.3d 204, 205 (Tex. 2008).
239. Civ. PRAC. & REM. § 51.014(a)(9)-(10); see Gilstrap, supra note 133, at 1026.
240. In reWoman's Hospital of Tex., Inc., 141 S.W.3d 144,148 (Tex. 2004) (Owen, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
241. Id.
242. Lewis, 253 S.W.3d at 205.
243. John G. George, Sandbagging Closed Texas Courtrooms with Senate Bill 15: The Texas Legislature's
Attempt to Control Frivolous Silicosis Claims Without Restricting the Constitutional Rights of Silicosis Sufferers,
38 ST. MARY'S L.J. 849, 854 (2006).
244. Act of May 11, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 97, § 1(d), ( , 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 169, 169-70
(citation omitted). The legislation-Senate Bill 15 had characteristics that overlapped with House
Bill 4 from the 2003 legislative session discussed above (through which the legislature enacted two
interlocutory appeal provisions in Section 51.014 concerning expert reports in health care liability
claims). Representative Joe Nixon, the author of House Bill 4, was the House sponsor of Senate
Bill 15. H. Comm. on Civ. Practices, Meeting Report, S.B. 15, 79th Leg., R.S. (May 3, 2005). Various
groups represented by witnesses testifying for and against House Bill 4 also had witnesses testify
concerning Senate Bill 15. Compare H. Comm. on Civ. Practices, Witness List, Tex. H.B. 4, 78th Leg.,
R.S. (Feb. 26, 2003), http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/78R/witlistmtg/html/C1002003
022614001.HTM (detailing witnesses supporting House Bill 4, including witnesses representing
organizations such as the Texas Civil Justice League, Texans for Lawsuit Reform, and including
witnesses opposing the bill, such as witnesses from the Texas Trial Lawyers Association), with S. Comm.
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proclaimed that the 2005 legislation-of which the interlocutory appeal
provision was a part-presented "[a] [n]ew [d]ay for [a]sbestos and [s]ilica
[l]itigation in Texas"' 24' while the "Plaintiffs Bar [b]emoan[ed] [e]nd of an
[e]ra as [t]ort [r]eformers [t]arget [a]sbestos[.]"2 4 6 Senate Bill 15 was "[o]ne
of the most highly publicized events of the 79th [Texas] Legislature" and it
was "expected to reduce drastically the number of asbestos and silica cases
that are filed in Texas and that are tried in Texas courts."2 4 7
The legislature made numerous findings at the beginning of the 2005 law,
including that (1) exposure to asbestos and silica has adverse health
effects2 48 ; (2) "hundreds of thousands of lawsuits alleging asbestos -related
disease ha[d] been filed throughout the United States" over the previous
thirty years, with a large increase in the 1990s; (3) "from 1988 to 2000, more
lawsuits alleging asbestos -related disease were filed in Texas than in any
other state"; (4) in recent years, the "number of new lawsuits alleging silica-
related disease being filed each year ha[d] risen precipitously"; and (5) both
asbestos claims and silica claims often arise when a person "is identified as
having markings on the individual's lungs" consistent with asbestos- or
silica-related disease but "has no functional or physical impairment" and yet
the person files a lawsuit "under the theory that" he or she "must do so to
avoid having the H claims barred by limitations [.]"249
To address this crisis, Senate Bill 15 imposed various requirements on
claimants, including filing a pre-trial report from a physician supporting the
claim.25 0 The law included a new section 90.007 of the Civil Practice and
Remedies Code.25 1 That section authorized a defendant to file a motion to
on State Affairs, Witness List, Tex. S.B. 15, 79th Leg., R.S. (Apr. 11, 2005), http://www.capitol.state.
tx.us/tlodocs/79R/witlistmtg/html/C5702005041109001.HTM (identifying witnesses supporting
Senate Bill 15, including those representing organizations such as the Texas Civil Justice League and
Texans for Lawsuit Reform, and also identifying those opposing the bill, including witnesses
representing organizations such as the Texas Trial Lawyers Association).
245. Kevin Risley, S.B. 15: A New DqyforAsbestos and Silica Litigation in Texas, 68 TEX. B.J. 696,
696 (2005).
246. Miriam Rozen, Paradise Lost: Plaintiffs BarBemoans End of an Era as Tort Reformers TargetAsbestos,
TEX. LAW., Feb. 28, 2005, at 1, 17.
247. Risley, supra note 245, at 696. Risley noted that "[t]here was little challenge to the bill as it
proceeded through the [l]egislature." Id. at n.1.
248. Act of May 11, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 97, § 1Qb), 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 169, 169
("Exposure to asbestos, particularly through inhalation of asbestos fibers, has allegedly been linked to
certain malignant and nonmalignant diseases, including mesothelioma and asbestosis.").
249. Id. § 1(c), (e), ($, (m), 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws at 169-70.
250. See id. § 2, secs. 90.003-.004, 90.006, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws at 173-76 (current version at TEX.
Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 90.003-.004, 90.006) (adding provisions entitled "Reports Required For
Claims Involving Asbestos-Related Injury" and "Reports Required For Claims Involving Silica-Related
Injury[,]" while also imposing a thirty day time limit on serving expert reports under these provisions).
251. Id. § 2, sec. 90.007, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws at 176-77 (current version at CIV. PRAC. & REM.
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dismiss-and the court to grant the motion-when a claimant does not file
the required physician's report or filed an inadequate report.2 52  Other
sections established a pre-trial multidistrict litigation procedure25 3 and
extended the statute of limitations for asbestos- or silica-related claims.254
As the legislature expressed, "the purpose of this Act" is:
[T]o protect the right of people with impairing asbestos-related and silica-
related injuries to pursue their claims for compensation in a fair and efficient
manner through the Texas court system, while at the same time preventing
scarce judicial and litigant resources from being misdirected by the claims of
individuals who have been exposed to asbestos or silica, but have no
functional or physical impairment from asbestos-related or silica-related
disease.2 5 5
Significantly for our focus: the Act added the eleventh type of appealable
interlocutory order to section 51.014. The new section 51.014(a)(11)
authorized appeal of an interlocutory order that "denies a motion to dismiss
filed under [s]ection 90.007.' '256 So in 2005, the legislature employed the
interlocutory appeal in the asbestos and silica litigation context as it did in
the health care liability context two years earlier it allowed an appeal of the
§ 90.007).
252. Id. § 2, sec. 90.007(a), (c), 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws at 176 (current version at CIV. PRAC. &REM.
§ 90.007 (a),(c)).
253. Id. § 2, sec. 90.010, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws at 177-79 (current version at Civ. PRAC. &REM.
§ 90.010) (permitting transfer to a MDL pretrial court "if [a] claimant fails to serve a report" in
accordance with sections 90.003 or 90.004, and detailing the procedural requirements for the court and
the parties upon transfer to a MDL pretrial court).
254. Id. § 4, sec. 16.0031(a)- o), 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws at 170-71, 179 (current version at CIV.
PRAc. &REM. § 16.0031(a)-()) (authorizing a cause of action to accrue, for purposes of an asbestos-
or silica-related injury, on the earlier of "the date of the exposed person's death" or the date the
claimant serves a compliant expert report); see also H. Research Org., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 15, 79th
Leg., R.S. (2005) ("The [statute of limitations] would begin to run either on the exposed person's death
or when the plaintiff served defendant a report complying with sec. 90.003 or sec. 90.004.").
255. Act of May 11, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 97, § 1(n), 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 169, 170; see S.
Research Ctr., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 15, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005) (concerning committee substituted
version); Union Carbide Corp. v. Synatzske, 438 S.W.3d 39,49-50 (Tex. 2014) (recounting the purpose
of the Act adding chapter 90 to the Civil Practice and Remedies Code); In re GlobalSanteFe Corp.,
275 S.W.3d 477, 482-83 (Vex. 2008) (describing the purpose of enacting chapter 90); Kansas City S.
Ry. Co. v. Oney, 380 S.W.3d 795, 800-01 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (stating the
reasons for enacting chapter 90).
256. Act of May 11, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 97, § 5, sec. 51.014(a), 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 169,
180 (current version at CIV. PRAc. & REM. § 51.014(a)(11)); see also CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 90.007(a) (West Supp. 2016) (allowing a defendant to dismiss asbestos- or silica-related claims if a
party fails to timely serve an expert report, or fails to serve an expert report in accordance with
sections 90.003 or 90.004).
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denial of a motion to dismiss for the plaintiffs failure to comply with a
pretrial requirement for an expert or physician report.25 7 In both instances,
the interlocutory appeal mechanism acted as an additional roadblock to
prevent unmeritorious claims from proceeding where the legislature
perceived there was a crisis burdening the dockets of the courts.
The 2005 legislation also allowed a litigant to file a petition for review to
the Texas Supreme Court "for an appeal of an interlocutory order" denying
a motion to dismiss asbestos- and silica-related claims.258 As noted above,
prior to the 2005 legislation, the supreme court had jurisdiction over only
two other types of section 51.014(a) appeals: appeals of interlocutory orders
concerning class certification and denials of summary judgment concerning
constitutional rights of media defendants or those publishing in the
media.259  By allowing a petition for review to the supreme court of an
appeal under section 51.014(a)(11), the legislature signaled its willingness to
employ all levels of the state's judicial system to address what it termed the
"crush of asbestos litigation" and the "precipitous H" rise of silica
litigation.
260
Although the legislature structured interlocutory appeals of asbestos and
silica claims under section 51.014(a)(11) in a similar way to interlocutory
appeals of health care liability claims under section 51.014(a)(9) and (a)(10),
the path to enactment of the provisions differed. As discussed above, the
interlocutory appeal provisions of the 2003 health care liability legislation
were not in the introduced version and became part of the law through
amendment.261 But two years later, the introduced version of Senate Bill 15
included the interlocutory appeal provisions concerning asbestos- and silica-
related claims.2 6 2 After its first reading, the bill was referred to the Senate
Committee on State Affairs, which substituted the original version with its
own and reported it favorably back to the Senate.263  This substituted
257. Compare Act ofMay 11,2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 97, § 5, sec. 51.014(a),2005 Tex. Gen. Laws
169, 180 (current version at CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 51.014(a)(11)) (allowing appeal of denial of a motion
to dismiss concerning expert reports of asbestos- or silica-related claims under section 90.007), with
Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, § 1.03, sec. 51.014(a), 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 847, 849
(current version at CIr. PRAC. & REM. § 51.014 (a)(9 )-(10)) (allowing appeal ofgrant or denial ofrelief
sought concerning expert reports in health care liability claims under section 74.351(b) and ($).
258. Act of May 11, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 97, § 6, sec. 22.225(d), 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 169,
180 (current version at GOV'T § 22.225(d)).
259. Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, § 1.02, sec. 22.225(d), 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws
847, 849 (current version at GOV'T § 22.225(d)).
260. Act of May 11, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, § 1(g), ($, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 169, 169-70.
261. Tex. H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003) (introduced version).
262. Tex. S.B. 15, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005) (introduced version).
263. S. Comm. on State Affairs, Committee Substitute, Tex. S.B. 15, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005)
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version allowed interlocutory appeals of orders concerning insufficient
physician reports under section 51.014(a)(11), but also proposed adding
another type of interlocutory appeal: appeals of orders granting or denying
a motion to dismiss or a motion to remand by a multidistrict litigation
(MDL) pretrial court.2 6 4  The proposed legislation allowed a "defendant
[to] file a notice of transfer [of the case] to the MDL pretrial court" if the
claimant failed to serve a sufficient physician report.165 The MDL pretrial
court could, based on the timing of filing the claim and sufficiency of the
physician report, retain jurisdiction, remand to the original trial court, or
dismiss.2 6 6 But when the Senate considered the bill, the Senate amended
the proposed legislation to drop this interlocutory appeal concerning MDL
pretrial court rulings.1 67 As a result, the 2005 law added only one provision
to section 51.014: to allow interlocutory appeal of an order denying a motion
to dismiss an asbestos- or silica-related claim based on the failure to serve
an adequate physician report.
2 6 8
F. Denial of a Motion to Dismiss Based on the Exerse of the Constitutiona! Rghts
of Free Speech, Petition, or Association Under the Citizen Rartijation Act
In 2013, the 83rd Texas Legislature passed the last two subsections of the
present Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014(a).26 9 When
enacted, the legislature mistakenly labeled both as
section 51.014(a)(12)270-an oversight the legislature corrected during the
84th Legislative Session in 2015.271 As a result, subsection (12) allows




267. S.J. ofTex., 79th Leg., R.S. 1380 (2005) (Floor Amendment No. One by SenatorJanek).
268. Act of May 11, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 97, § 5, sec. 51.014(a), 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 169,
180 (current version at TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(11)).
269. Act of May 24,2013, 83d Leg., R.S., ch. 1042, § 4, sec. 51.014(a), 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 2499,
2500 (currentversion at Civ. PRAC. &REM. § 51.014(a)(12)); Act of May 1, 2013, 83d Leg., R.S., ch. 44,
§ 1, sec. 51.014(a), 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 93, 93-94 (current version at CIV. PRAC. & REM.
§ 51.014(a)(13)).
270. Compare Act of May 24, 2013, 83d Leg., R.S., ch. 1042, § 4, sec. 51.014(a), 2013 Tex. Gen.
Laws 2499, 2500 (current version at CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 51.014(a)(12)) (adding section 51.014(a)(12)
to allow "appeal of an interlocutory order" from the "deni[al] [of] a motion to dismiss filed under
Section 27.003"), with Act of May 1, 2013, 83d Leg., R.S., ch. 44, § 1, sec. 51.014(a), 2013 Tex. Gen.
Laws 93, 93-94 (current version at CIV. PRAC. &REM. § 51.014(a)(13)) (adding section 51.014(a)(12)
to allow "appeal from an interlocutory order" from the "deni[al] [of] a motion for summary judgment
filed by an electric utility regarding liability in a suit subject to Section 75.0022").
271. See Act of May 29, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 1236, 3.001, sec. 51.014(a), 2015 Tex. Gen.
Laws 4096, 4098 (current version at CIV. PRAC. & REM. 51.014(a)(12)-(13)) (segregating the
provisions into subsection (12) and subsection (13)).
20161
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interlocutory appeals of denials of motions to dismiss under the Texas
Citizen Participation Act, and subsection (13) authorizes interlocutory
appeals of denials of summary judgment based on the limited liability of
electric utility companies.2 7 2
In 2011, two years prior to passage of section 51.014(a)(12), the
legislature enacted the Citizen Participation Act as chapter 27 of the Civil
Practice and Remedies Code.2 73  The Act gives protection to individuals
and entities that express "communication[s]" concerning "matters of public
concern."2 74 The legislation establishes a procedure for dismissal of suits
shown to suppress the rights of speech, petition, or association.2 75
By the next legislative session in 2013, legislators recognized "there ha[d]
been some inconsistency in the interpretation of theH provisions" allowing
appeal of an order denying a motion to dismiss under chapter 27.276 The
Senate Research Center stated that the "original statute passed last session
provided for three situations where a party to the cause of action could
appeal the interlocutory order disposing of the [m]otion to [d]ismiss": (1) "if
the trial court failed to act within the time period in the statute"; (2) "if the
trial court granted the motion"; or (3) "if the trial court denied the
motion. '2 7 7  The Senate Research Center bill analysis noted that in "the
process of these 'motions' going through the court system, the Second
Court of Appeals ruled that in the case of a denial of a motion to dismiss
signed by a judge, the statute did not allow an interlocutory appeal[,]" while
"[b]oth the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Courts of Appeals have ruled that
the existing statute does provide for the right to an interlocutory appeal
272. Id.
273. Act of May 21, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 341, § 2, secs. 27.001-.011, 2011 Tex. Gen Laws
961, 96144 (current version at CIV. PRAC. &REM. § 27.001-.011).
274. Id. § 2, sec. 27.001, 2011 Tex. Gen Laws at 96142 (current version at TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. § 27.001); see CIV. PRAC. & REM. ch. 27 (West Supp. 2016) (codifying the Citizen Participation
Act); see also Tate Hemingson, Anti-SLAPP Statute Changes: Slap Back with an Interlocutoy Appeal When
You Get Slapped Down, STRASBURGER Elan. 27, 2014), http://www.strasburger.com/anti-slapp-statute-
changes-slap-back-interlocutory-appeal-get-slapped (recognizing the "significant protections" given to
citizens who express "matters ofpublic concern").
275. See Act of May 21, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 341, § 2, sec. 27.003, 2011 Tex. Gen Laws 961,
962 (current version at CIr. PRAc. & REM. § 27.003) (authorizing a motion to dismiss); see also CIV.
PRAC. &REM. § 27.002 ("The purpose of this chapter is to encourage and safeguard the constitutional
rights of persons to petition, speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in the government
to the maximum extent permitted by law and, at the same time, protect the rights of a person to file
meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury.").
276. H. Comm. on Judiciary & Civ. Jurisprudence, Bill Analysis, Tex. C.S.H.B. 2935, 83d
Leg., R. S. (2013).
277. S. Research Ctr., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 2935, 83d Leg., R.S. (2013).
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under these circumstances."27 These courts interpreted section 27.008 of
the Civil Practice and Remedies Code differently. That section read:
(a) If a court does not rule on a motion to dismiss under Section 27.003 in the
time prescribed by Section 27.005, the motion is considered to have been
denied by operation of law and the moving party may appeal.
(b) An appellate court shall expedite an appeal or other writ, whether
interlocutory or not, from a trial court order on a motion to dismiss a legal
action under Section 27.003 or from a trial court's failure to rule on that
motion in the time prescribed by Section 27.005.
(c) An appeal or other writ under this section must be filed on or before the
60th day after the date the trial court's order is signed or the time prescribed
by Section 27.005 expires, as applicable.
279
The Second Court of Appeals concluded that the plain language of
section 27.008 of the Citizen Participation Act statutorily authorized
interlocutory appeals only in "situations in which a trial court has failed to
timely rule on a timely-filed motion to dismiss," but "does not create an
interlocutory appeal from a timely-signed trial court order that denies a
timely-filed [C]hapter 27 motion to dismiss."128 0  But the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Courts of Appeals concluded that holding that "no signed order
can be the subject of an interlocutory appeal" would render language in
section 27.008 superfluous.28 1  In response to these conflicting
interpretations, the Senate Research Center noted the purpose of the 2013
legislation was "to clarify the legislative intent to provide for an interlocutory
appeal in all three of the circumstances outlined in Chapter 27 [.]"282 As the
supreme court recognized in 2015, the 2013 law adding
section 51.014(a)(12) "clarified that an interlocutory appeal is permitted
from any interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss under the
278. Id.; see San Jacinto Title Sefvs. of Corpus Christi, LLC. v. Kingsley Props., LP., 452 S.W.3d
343, 348-49 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 2013, pet. denied) (discussing the divergent interpretations
by courts of appeals).
279. Act of May 21, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 341, § 2, sec. 27.008(a)-(c), 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws
961, 963, repealed y Act of May 24, 2013, 83d Leg., R.S., ch. 1042, § 5, sec. 27.0 0 8 (c), 2013 Tex. Gen.
Laws 2499, 2500 (repealing subsection (c)).
280. Jennings v. Wallbuilder Presentations, Inc., 378 S.W.3d 519, 524, 529 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2012, pet. denied), superseded &y statute, § 5, sec. 27.008(c), 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2500.
281. San Jacinto Title Serns., 452 S.W.3d at 348 (quoting Direct Corn. Funding, Inc. v. Beacon Hill
Estates, LLC, No. 14-12-00896-CV, 2013 WL 407029, at *3-4 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.]
Jan. 24, 2013, order)); see also Better Bus. Bureau of Metro. Dall., Inc., v. BH DFW, Inc. 402 S.W.3d
299, 307 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2013, pet. denied) (recognizing a split of authority and finding the
Fourteenth Court Appeals' reasoning persuasive).
282. S. Research Ctr., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 2935, 83d Leg., R.S. (2013).
20161
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TCPA."28 3 In addition, the legislature added appeals denying a motion to
dismiss under the Citizen Participation Act to the group of three other
section 51.014(a) appeals that stay trial court proceedings: (1) orders
concerning class certification; (2) denials of summary judgment based on
official immunity; and (3) the grant or denial of "a plea to the jurisdiction by
a governmental unit[.]"
28 4
The witnesses who testified or registered before the House Committee
on Judiciary and Civil Jurisprudence in favor of the bill reflected the media's
support. Witnesses included representatives of the Freedom of Information
Foundation of Texas, the Texas Press Association, the Texas Broadcast
Association, the Texas Association of Broadcasters, and the Austin
American-Statesman.285 Also among the witnesses were representatives of
Texans for Lawsuit Reform and the Texas Civil Justice League-
organizations that had supported enacting interlocutory appeals in health
care liability claims and in asbestos- and silica-related claims.286  No
witnesses testified against the legislation.28 7
As the Senate Research Center expressed in 2011, the purpose of the
Texas Citizen Participation Act is to "allow defendants-who are sued as a
result of exercising their right to free speech or their right to petition the
government-to" avoid "frivolous lawsuits" and to "encourag[e] public
participation by citizens by protecting a person's right to petition, right of
free speech, and right of association from meritless lawsuits arising from
actions taken in furtherance of those rights."128 8  Section 51.014(a)(12)
bolstered this purpose of avoiding frivolous lawsuits and encouraging public
participation by granting defendants in those suits the right to immediate
appeal.
28 9
G. Denial of a Motion for SummagT Judgment by an Electic Utiliy Company
Asserting Limited Ljabilit
In 2013, the legislature added another-and currently the last-category
283. In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 585 n.2 (Tex. 2015).
284. Act of-May 24,2013, 83d Leg., R.S., ch. 1042, § 4, sec. 51.014(b), 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 2499,
2500 (current version at TEx. CI\. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(b)); see alo CIV. PRAC. & REM.
§ 51.014(b) (West Supp. 2016) ("An interlocutory appeal under [s]ubsection (a)(3), (5), (8), or (12) also
stays all other proceedings in the trial court pending resolution of that appeal.").
285. H. Comm. on Judiciary & Civ. Jurisprudence, Witness List, Tex. H.B. 2935, 83d Leg., R.S.




288. S. Research Ctr., Bill Analysis, Tex. C.S.H.B. 2973, 82d Leg., R.S. (2011).
289. CIV. PRAC. &REM. § 51.014(a)(12).
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of interlocutory appeal permitted under Section 51.014(a) of the Civil
Practice and Remedies Code: appeal of the denial of a summary judgment
motion "filed by an electric utility" company asserting limited liability under
section 75.0022 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.2 90 No legislator
voted against the measure in either the Senate or the House.2 9 1
Section 75.0022-enacted during the same 2013 legislative session-
allows electric utility companies to enter into recreational use agreements
with a political subdivision and limits the companies' liability under those
agreements.2 9 2 The legislation also made the doctrine of attractive nuisance
inapplicable to certain claims against the utility company and authorized the
recreational use agreement to include a provision requiring the political
subdivision to pay for or provide insurance to cover damage claims against
the utility company.2 9 3  The legislation also added the current
section 51.014(a)(13),294 which allows the electric utility company to appeal
an interlocutory order denying its motion for summary judgment based on
its limited liability under section 75.0022.295
The House and Senate committee bill analyses spelled out the underlying
reasons for providing limited liability to electric utility companies and the
associated provision for interlocutory appeals for denials of summary
judgment. As the Senate Research Center stated:
Public hike and bike trails provide many benefits, including supplementing
transportation infrastructure, reducing congestion, connecting communities,
and encouraging a healthy lifestyle. However, acquiring real estate in an urban
area that is suitable for development of hike and bike trails can be both
difficult and expensive. By utilizing an electric utility's property, miles of
public hike and bike trails can be constructed at virtually no cost for land.
290. Act of May 1, 2013, 83d Leg., R.S., ch. 44, § 1, sec. 51.014(a), 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 93, 93-
94 (current version at CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 51.014(a)(13)).
291. See i. § 6,2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 95 (listing zero "nays" for both the House and the Senate
upon its passage).
292. Id. § 3, sec. 75.0022, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 94 (current version at CIV. PRAC. & REM.
§75.0022(c)-(f).
293. Id. § 3, sec. 75.0022, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 95 (current version at CIr. PRAC. & REM.
S75.0022 (g)-(I)). But the law did not allow electric utilities to avoid liability for serious bodily injury
or death proximately caused by the electric utility's willful or wanton acts or gross negligence. Id. § 3,
sec. 75.0022, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 94 (current version at CIV. PRAC. & CODE § 75.0022(e)).
294. As discussed above, the provision was originally designated section 51.014(a)(12), but revised
to be section 51.014(a)(13) in the 2015 legislative session. Act of May 29, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S.,
ch. 1236, § 3.001, sec. 51.014(a), 2015 Tex. Gen. Laws 4096, 4098 (current version at CIV. PRAC. &
REM. § 51.014(a)(12)-(13)) (resolving the legislative misstep).
295. Act of May 1, 2013, 83d Leg., R.S., ch. 44, § 3, sec. 51.014(a), 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 93, 94
(current version at CiV. PRAc. & REM. § 51.014(a)(13)).
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[House Bill] 200 seeks to establish limitations on the liability of certain electric
utilities that allow public use of the utility's property for recreation and certain
other purposes.
Under current law, an owner of real property who opens the owner's land
for recreational use is liable for property damage, injury, or death arising from
gross negligence on the part of the property owner, or if the owner has acted
with malicious intent or in bad faith. Additionally, public utilities located in El
Paso and municipal management districts in Houston may require that the
municipality, county, or political subdivision carry general liability insurance
to insure the public utility for liability.
296
One provision of the 2013 law limits the applicability of the law and, by
association, the interlocutory appeal provision: Section 75.0022 "applies
only to an electric utility located in a county with a population of four million
or more."2 9 7  The Senate Research Center indicated why the legislation
applied only in a county with a large population and its intended geographic
focus: "[House Bill] 200 will assist in the development of hike and bike trails
in Harris County."' 298  Four of the seven witnesses who testified or
registered in favor of the bill (no witnesses were against it) included
representatives of the Greater Houston Partnership, the City of Houston,
and Harris County.2 9 9 Yet although the purpose of the law and the
geographic area intended to benefit were definite and limited, the case law
does not indicate the extent to which electric utility companies have entered
into recreational use agreements under section 75.0022. At present, no
reported cases have concerned either section 75.0022 or the associated
interlocutory appeal provision, section 51.014(a) (13).
IV. CONCLUSION
In 2012-one hundred and twenty years after the Texas Legislature
passed the first statute authorizing an interlocutory appeal-Justice Sue
Walker of the Second Court of Appeals described interlocutory appeals as
"the new norm. '300  Walker cautioned that the rise in the number of
296. S. Research Ctr., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 200, 83d Leg., R.S. (2013).
297. Act of May 1, 2013, 83d Leg., R.S., ch. 44, § 3, sec. 75.0022, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 93, 94
(current version at TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 75.0022b)).
298. S. Research Ctr., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 200, 83d Leg., R.S. (2013).
299. H. Comm. on Judiciary & Civ. Jurisprudence, Witness List, Tex. H.B. 200, 83d Leg., R.S.
(Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/83R/witlistmtg/pdf/C3302013031114001.
PDF.
300. Sue Walker, InterlocutogAppeals, TEX. CiV. App. PRAc. 101 (State Bar of Tex. 2012) (updating
and modifying Pamela Stanton Baron, Interlocutog Appeals 2010, CONFERENCE ON STATE AND
[Vol. 48:65
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interlocutory appeals "impact[s] the ability of the courts of appeals to timely
handle and process non interlocutory, non accelerated appeals."30 1 Yet
when the legislature passed the thirteen types of interlocutory appeals now
authorized under Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014(a),
legislators specifically carved out discrete types of orders from the norm of
the final judgment rule. Each of these disparate and broad-ranging
categories of orders are similar in a central respect: each time the legislature
enacted one of these interlocutory appeal provisions, the legislature viewed
the matter for which it authorized an immediate appeal to be of particular
concern. The concerns ranged from the appointment of receivers and
trustees in 1892 to the viability of class actions in the 1970s to tort reform
efforts in connection with health care liability claims and asbestos- and
silica-related claims in the early-2000s. As legal concerns and priorities have
shifted over the century, so has the content of the interlocutory appeal
provisions authorized under section 51.014.
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